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The V-22 was designed from the ground up to satisfy
missions required by all military services. It is an airplane
that represents the leading edge of tiltrotor technology.
Since Secretary Cheney's decision to cancel the V-22 in 1989,
lines of political competition have been drawn. Continued
support for the V-22 comes from an influential group within
Congress determined to advance the program based on its civil
application. The V-22 no longer represents a purely
programmatic issue. It now represents a battle between the
Executive and Legislative branches over their specific defense
responsibilities. This thesis addresses two primary research
questions. First, using the V-22 as a case study, what are
the programmatic and financial implications for the Department
of Defense and industry of dual-use technology? Second, what
does the V-22 teach us about the process of defense budgeting?
Throughout the thesis emphasis is placed on the actions of the
committees of Congress responsible for the defense budget, and
specifically the V-22. This thesis examines the roles and
relationships between the "players" throughout the history of
the V-22 program to determine if any useful analogies may be
identified with respect to present and future defense
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I . INTRODUCTION
A. AREA OF RESEARCH
Universally known as a "political football," the V-22
Osprey is a highly visible airplane at the forefront of
defense department budget negotiation over the past several
years. Political support for the program is broad.
Unfortunately, budget constraints have forced difficult
decisions resulting in a cancellation of V-22 production.
The Marine Corps' medium lift helicopter, the CH-46 Sea
Knight, is well into its third decade of operation. This
factor, combined with Marine Corps emphasis on maneuver
warfare, made necessary a decision for an acceptable
replacement. During 1983 the Department of Defense informed
Congress that the V-22 was designed to perform seven missions,
including the medium lift amphibious assault mission assigned
to the Marine Corps (Phoncon Bell-Boeing PAO Officer, 1991) 1 .
This thesis presents an analysis of the V-22 in financial
and budgeting terms. The concept of dual -use technology is
explored as part of considering whether this factor is likely
to enhance the realization of the V-22 and other potential
1 The seven missions that the V-22 was designed to perform are Marine
medium lift amphibious assault and national executive transport; Naval strike
rescue, special warfare and fleet logistics; Air Force long-range special
operations and Army tactical mobility/aeromedical evacuation.
dual-use programs. In describing the legislative history of
the program, emphasis is placed on the actions of the
committees of Congress responsible for the defense budget, and
specifically for the V-22. It also examines the Secretary of
Defense's decision to terminate production of the V-22.
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The thesis addresses two primary research questions.
First, using the V-22 as a case example, what are the
programmatic and financial implications for the Department of
Defense and industry of dual -use technology? Second, what
does the V-22 teach us about the process of defense budgeting?
Subsidiary research questions are:
• How do DoD, Congress, and contractors view the importance
of potential civilian applications resulting from V-22?
• Given a declining military budget, should the Department
of Defense continue programs such as the V-22 to sustain
the industrial base?
• What are/were the roles and relationships between the
military departments, the Department of Defense, the
contractors, and Congress in budgeting for the V-22?
• What are the programmatic implications resulting from the
political competition between the Secretary of Defense and
Congress and other interested parties in financial terms,
and in terms of decisions on the future of the V-22?
C. DISCUSSION
Many factors influence Department of Defense acquisition
decisions. First, the top line Department of Defense budget
is programmed for reduction; therefore, fiscal restraint is
the reality of the future. Second, high visibility, high
dollar value programs that have not yet begun production have
been subjected to unprecedented scrutiny. Considering these
factors, the prudent question to ask is, what can be safely
trimmed and what should be retained in the Department of
Defense budget?
Marine Commandants' General P.X. Kelly and General A.M.
Gray have testified before Congress that meeting the Corps'
medium lift needs represents a top priority. The V-22 is an
airplane designed and built by Bell-Textron and Boeing, that
among other applications, will support Marine Corps medium
lift requirements into the 21st century. The V-22 takes off
like a helicopter, tilts its rotors situated at the wing tips,
and flies horizontally like a turboprop airplane.
Tiltrotor technology resulting from the V-22 could have a
substantial civilian "spinoff" effect. Broadly known as dual-
use technology, the processes and knowledge gained in building
the V-22 could positively and substantially impact the design
of an airplane for civil application. So promising is this
"dual" application that the V-22 has gained global attention.
The V-22 came into the political spotlight in 1989 when
Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney cancelled funding for the
program. His decision was motivated by a shrinking Department
of Defense budget and advice that less expensive alternatives
(different mixes of upgraded conventional helicopters) could
be funded to meet the Marine Corps medium lift requirement.
Currently, Congress has appropriated funding for V-22
research and development (R&D) and procurement. However,
previously budgeted procurement funding has either been
reprogrammed or cancelled by DoD. Four V-22 prototypes
continue operational testing to satisfy contractual
requirements
.
Since DoD made the decision to cancel the V-22, political
lines of competition have been drawn. Officially, the
Department of Defense and some members and staff in Congress
recognize the capabilities of the V-22 but believe, given the
current budget environment, that the program is not
supportable. Yet, Department of Defense resistance may be
softening. The "tiltrotor coalition" opposes the decision to
cancel the V-22 program. This grass roots coalition consists
of members of Congress, public officials, contractors, and
retired military personnel. Both sides in this resource
competition are powerful
.
The V-22 has broad political support partly because
components are manufactured in nearly every state in our
union. Also, the V-22 provides an alternative to congested
national airspace - a concern at both the metropolitan and
federal levels. The global competitive environment has little
tolerance for technical inefficiency. Fortunately, the United
States is the preeminent leader in tiltrotor technology. The
view has been advanced that before reducing investment in this
technology and losing its economic potential, production of
the V-22 deserves more thorough review.
D. SCOPE OF THE THESIS
Briefly, the evolution of tiltrotor capabilities and the
importance of the V-22 are presented as background. With
respect to the V-22, the thesis familiarizes the reader with
dual-use technology and its application within DoD. The
thesis analyzes in detail program budgeted funding requested
for the V-22 by the Department of Defense and approved by the
House and Senate Armed Services Committees (HASC, SASC), the
House and Senate Appropriations Committees (HAC, SAC), and the
final amounts approved in congressional conferences. The
thesis also describes the relationships between the Department




Data has been obtained from documents provided by
contractors, military officials, and authorities within the V-
22 technology coalition. Periodicals, articles, and documents
from both public and private institutions have been studied.
Interviews with knowledgeable personnel at NPS, military
program officials involved with the V-22 program, V-22
contractors, congressional staffers, and other experts provide
essential input by validating material contained in this
thesis. Finally, congressional testimony was examined in
detail to test the financial and other questions investigated
in the thesis.
F. BENEFITS OF THE THESIS
Examining the V-22 in terms of dual -use technology places
this issue within the current defense policy context.
Department of Defense acquisition instructions now require the
evaluation of dual-use technology, as an acquisition strategy,
in supporting documentation for all new systems. While budget
data on the V-22 are a matter of public record, no document
comprehensively consolidates and explains budget competition
over the V-22 in the policy and political context. Implicit
in the budget data are political assumptions and decisions
that became apparent when compared and contrasted. Further,
the V-22 as a case study may be used in future instruction and
research programs at the Naval Postgraduate School in the
Acquisition & Contract Management and Financial Management
curricula
.
II. V-22 OVERVIEW - 1958 TO THE PRESENT
A. PURPOSE OF CHAPTER
This chapter analyzes the utility of the V-22 and explains
in detail why the acquisition of the airplane is thought to be
crucial to the Marine Corps inventory. The mystery of
tiltrotor technology, evolution of the V-22 program including
characteristics, capabilities, and enabling technologies, and
a brief summary of the contract is provided as background
information. Finally, a program and budget status update is
furnished to set the stage for the remainder of the thesis.
B. ARGUMENTS TO EXPLAIN WHY THE MARINE CORPS WANTS THE V-22
The Marine Corps is in the waning stages of a
modernization block for its warfare hardware and doctrine to
sustain fruitful operations well into the future. New jet
airplanes (FA-18, AV-8B), light and heavy helicopters (AH-1W,
CH-53E), and amphibious ships (USS Wasp class, LCAC), have
been added to the inventory in the past decade. The final
requirement to complete this modernization block is for a
major system acquisition to replace the distinguished CH-46
Sea Knight - the Marine Corp's current medium lift assault
transport helicopter.
Wars and the battlefields on which they are fought are
dynamic. Historic battles, fought along relatively stable and
lateral lines, provide the military professional with points
of reference. However, the probability of future conflicts of
this nature may be waning. According to a Marine Corps
publication on warfighting:
If we are to win, we must be able to operate in a
disorderly environment. In fact we must not only be able
to fight effectively in the face of disorder, we should
seek to generate disorder for our opponent and use it as
a weapon against him. (FMFM-1, 1989, p. 10)
Hence, Marine Corps doctrine seeks to create, and then fight
effectively in chaos.
The two styles of warfare common to all combatants are
warfare by attrition and warfare by maneuver. An attrition
style of warfare, by definition, is protracted, costly, and
probably will not be popular in the United States due to the
casualty rate.
Because we have long enjoyed vast numerical and
technological superiority, the United States has
traditionally waged war by attrition. However, Marine
Corps doctrine today is based on warfare by maneuver....
(FMFM-1, 1989, p. 30)
Maneuver warfare emphasizes speed and initiative. An
aggressor seeks to shatter an opponent both physically and
mentally. Shock, surprise, boldness, and the creation of
relentless stress for the enemy are the commander's tools of
maneuver warfare.
Speed is relative. A force possessing speed over an
opponent gains, by default, an additional weapon. This was
recognized by Sun Tzu:
Speed is the essence of war. Take advantage of the
enemy's unpreparedness ; travel by unexpected routes and
strike him where he has taken no precautions. (FMFM-1,
1989, p. 16)
War combines a human and physical element. The physical
element is controllable, while the human element can only be
"influenced" by the leadership at hand. Given the violence
and finality of war we must seek every opportunity to enhance
our probability for success. Fortunately, the United States
has a long history of successful development and exploitation
of military hardware. Through continued advancement of
technology our nation's combatants will be able to maintain
this advantage on the battlefield. "We must stay abreast of
this process of change, for the belligerent who first exploits
a development in the art and science of war gains a
significant, if not decisive, advantage." (FMFM-1, 1989, p.
14)
The Marine Corps organization for warfare centers on the
Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) . Task organizations
consist of air, ground, and combat support units. These
expeditionary units are composite to the situation at hand.
Relying on speed and shock ability, they are completely self
contained
.
The notion that "a team is only as strong as its weakest
link" applies to the hardware necessary to support maneuver
warfare. One can only speculate on the outcome of the 1980
mission to rescue American hostages in Tehran had the V-22
been available 1 . The American hostage rescue operation
involved multiple airplanes, and was to span 35 hours in
duration. By comparison, a single V-22 airplane could have
completed the operation in eight hours. The "weak" link was
hardware. However, it seems likely that missions analogous to
the Tehran rescue attempt will confront the Marine Corps in
the future.
C. WHAT IS A TILTROTOR?
Helicopters, the precursor to tiltrotor airplanes,
encountered limited and somewhat experimental use during the
later stages of WWII and the Korean conflict. Their use
became prevalent, if not imperative, during the Vietnam war.
Since then engineers have sought to combine the advantages of
Vertical/Short Take-Off and Landing (V/STOL) with the speed
and efficiency of turboprops. Experiments fell into the
categories of tiltwings, tiltrotors, tilt-ducts, and compound
autogyros. (Thornborough, 1990, p. 2)
A tiltrotor is a hybrid airplane that can take off, hover,
and land like a helicopter. Additionally, by tilting its
wingtip rotor stems (nacelles) forward, it can fly like a
turboprop airplane. It combines the attributes of helicopters
(low speed, hovering ability, good stability/controllability,
LGen. Keith Smith, USMC (Ret), gives an account of V-22 applications
under warfare situations in his article, "Potential Value of the MV-22 in Desert
Shield/Storm Examined," Amphibious Warfare Review , Summer 1991.
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and safe autorotation in the event of power loss) with the
attributes of a turboprop (high speed, altitude, and relative
efficiency). In short, a tiltrotor is a turboprop airplane
that does not require a runway. (Norwine, January/February
1990, p. 40)
To understand where the V-22 fits into the scheme of
modern aviation, we may compare on a continuum of hover
efficiency, the modern helicopter (most efficient) and the AV-
8B Harrier thrust jet (least efficient). The V-22 is close to
the helicopter followed by the tiltwing concept and then by
the vectored thrust airplane (Harrier). (Norwine,
January/February 1990, p. 41)
D. EVOLUTION OF THE V-22
During the 1950's, tiltrotor technology made significant
advances with the development of prototype airplanes such as
the Bell XV-3 and the Boeing VZ-2 tiltwing. These airplanes
looked like a cross between a horror movie mutant insect and
the erector sets one used to assemble "contraptions" with as
a child. In December of 1972, NASA and the Army contracted
with Bell and Boeing to develop two prototype airplanes.
(Ryan, 1990, p. 4) The Bell-Boeing effort produced the XV-15,
a true tiltrotor airplane. In 1979, the XV-15, the precursor
to the V-22, made its historic maiden flight. (Thornborough,
1990, p. 4)
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Late in 1981 the Under Secretary of Defense (Research and
Engineering) sent a memorandum to the service secretaries
suggesting that Marine assault, Air Force special operations,
Army electronic warfare, and Navy search and rescue could best
be done utilizing mature technology, such as a derivative of
the XV-15. By December of the same year, the Deputy Secretary
of Defense formally established the Joint Services Aircraft
Program (JVX). (GAO, 1986, p. 2)
The year 1982 proved a busy year with respect to V-22
developments. First, the Joint Technical Assessment Group
(JTAG), "concluded that the application of tilt rotor
technology offered the best potential for a common multi-
service aircraft" (GAO, 1986, p. 2). Concurrently, in
anticipation of a potential government contract, Bell
Helicopter Textron, headquartered in Fort Worth, Texas, and
Boeing Helicopters, headquartered in Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania, formed a teaming agreement. Next, the Army,
Navy and Air Force signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)
for the JVX program designating the Army as the executive
service, with a Marine colonel as the program manager, and
committing $167 million in FY-84 funding (Army $78 million,
Navy $70 million, and Air Force $19 million). (GAO report,
1986, p. 3) For reasons detailed in a subsequent chapter, the
Army later withdrew as the executive service.
In September of 1983 (FY-84), the Defense Resources Board
(DRB) approved continuation of the JVX program with the Navy
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to receive full program funding (Research and Development) in
its Total Obligation Authority (TOA) . During 1984 the
Secretary of the Navy selected the name Osprey, after the
marine bird of prey that can both swoop and hover
(Thornborough, 1990, p. 4). In January of 1985, the Osprey
was designated V-22 Osprey. The Bell-Boeing team began Full
Scale Development (FSD) during 1985; however, it was not until
the following year that the $1.8 billion contract was
officially awarded. On March 19, 1989, the V-22 flew for the
first time. (Phoncon Bell-Boeing PAO Officer, 1991)
Facing a dramatically decreasing defense budget, the
Secretary of Defense decided to cancel the V-22 program in
1989 and the Administration subsequently submitted a FY-90
budget with zero funding for continuation of the program.
During December of 1989, Deputy Secretary of Defense Donald
Atwood instructed the Naval Air Systems Command^ (NAVAIR) to
cancel $330 million of appropriated funds for V-22 long-lead
advanced production contracts, many already in progress.
Since then, an increasingly interested Congress has continued
research and development (R&D) funding for the completion of
six prototype airplanes . (Thornborough, 1990, p. 35).
The Naval Air Systems Command is the program sponsor for the V-22.
Until the recent crash of plane no. 5, production on the no. 6 plane
had been suspended in an effort to conserve available funding (Ferber, 1991, p.
7).
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Appendix (A) gives the reader a thorough chronology of events
associated with the V-22.
1. Performance Characteristics and Capabilities
When loaded with its full complement of 24 combat
equipped Marines, the V-22 can fly 500 nautical miles (nm)
,
2100 nm dry, at speeds over 275 knots. The airplane is self-
deployable and can respond globally within 36 hours, where
upon it can go immediately into action without ensuing
maintenance. (Ryan, 1990, p. 10) The V-22 can lift three
times its own structural weight, i.e., it can carry as much as
20,000 pounds internally, or 15,000 pounds from two external
cargo hooks (Arnold, Tripp, 1990, p. 8). Also, when fitted
for a secondary mission of in-flight refueling, the V-22 can
carry enough fuel to keep four AV-8B Harriers flying for an
additional hour.
The V-22's Primary Flight Control System (PFCS)
controls cockpit operations, one of three enabling
technologies, providing all the necessary flight information
to control the airplane and prevent any potentially dangerous
maneuvers. The pilot obtains the "feeling" of flight control
via stick and pedal force; however, PFCS does all the work
(Thornborough, 1990, p. 22). An additional safety feature
includes lubrication to the transmission for 30 minutes if
hydraulics fail. The engines are connected by a drive shaft


































































Additional enabling technologies include fly-by-wire
control and the composite materials that make up the V-22. In
novice terms, fly-by-wire means a myriad of tiny wires replace
pulleys, pushrods, and hydraulic lines for increased safety
and reliability. The primary fuselage contains more than 90%
epoxy graphite. This provides a corrosion resistent,
ballistic tolerant, durable and highly survivable airplane.
The V-22 is specifically designed for ship board
operations. For example, automatic on command, the rotors
fold horizontal to the wing, and then the entire wing rotates
90 degrees, providing a compact stowing size of approximately
18 by 62 feet (Thornbcrough, 1990, pp. 12-13). Also, as
pilots typically land on a ship from the left (port) side, the
pilot's position on the V-22 is shifted to the right side of




The three principle contractors working on the V-22 are
Bell Helicopter Textron, Boeing Helicopters, and General
Motors-Allison. Components for the V-22 come from 2250
subcontractors located in 47 states (Ryan, 1990, p. 5). Bell
is tasked with flight testing prototypes numbered one, three,
and six (Arnold, Tripp, 1990, p. 3). Additionally, Bell is
responsible for the wing, nacelles, drive, propulsion, and
rotor systems.
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Boeing is tasked with flight testing prototypes numbered
two, four, and five (Arnold, Tripp, 1990, p. 3). Boeing is
also responsible for the fuselage, landing gear, flight
controls, and avionics. Compatibility is ensured through the
establishment of a Joint Project Office (JPO) and through
Interface Control Documents (ICD's) that provide very detailed
interface requirements. Combined the Bell -Boeing team has
over 60 years of tiltrotor experience (Arnold, Tripp, 1990, p.
16).
General Motors-Allison is tasked with providing the power
for the V-22. Derived from the T56 turboprop, a pair of T406-
AD-400 turboshaft engines will provide the V-22 with 6,159
shaft horsepower (Thornborough, 1990, pp. 13-14)"1 .
The Bell -Boeing team was surprised by the anomaly
presented to them when the Secretary of the Navy directed that
the Full Scale Development (FSD) contract be changed from Cost
Plus (CP) to Fixed Price (FP) in 1985 (Phoncon Bell-Boeing
Supervisor Naval Requirements and Marketing Director, 1991).
At that time the contractor had invested $85 million of
company resources in anticipation of receiving the award and
to prevent scheduling delays.
Historically, CP contracts exceed both anticipated cost
and schedule (Smith, 1989, p. 1). Secretary Lehman, seeking
to avoid the perennial battles with Congress, especially given
The T56 turboprop is the engine that pushes the Lockheed C-130 Hercules
and P-3 Orion.
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the plentiful number of sel f -proclaimed contracting experts on
the hill, felt tiltrotor technology had matured enough to
reduce government risk. Therefore, he directed the use of a
FP type contract for the V-22 program. A FP contract would
force both the program manager and contractor to conduct a
thorough review of proposed specifications. (Smith, 1989, p.
9) Ironically, the General Accounting Office determined that
the V-22 program should be considered high risk . Current
Department of Defense acquisition instructions (DODI 5000.1)
would appropriately assign a program given this designation to
a CP contract
.
By returning to the original acquisition strategy
additional insight on this issue may be garnered. The Navy
anticipated that more than one contractor would compete during
the preliminary design phase and expected to award the
contract by a competitive wind tunnel "fly-off" (Smith, 1989,
p. 7). Sikorsky gave serious consideration to submission of
a proposal but pulled out at the last moment. The commander
of the Naval Air Systems Command made the following comment:
As to why no other proposal was received, it can only be
surmised. Even with the expansion of the initial effort
to 23 months work, other industry management may have
perceived that the Bel 1 -Boeing ' s lead and prior experience
with tilt rotors was insurmountable. Even though NASA's
complete tilt rotor data package had been made available,
they apparently felt that, without a further expansion of
the effort, i.e., 33 months, the probability of winning
A high risk is associated with events that require rescheduling of
higher manpower application to prevent an impact on production schedules or cost
(GAO report B-240825, 1990, p. 6).
19
was low. The Bell-Boeing team had put their company
resources at risk and formed working teams while the
program was still in the formative stages. No one else
made comparable commitment. (GAO report, 1986, pp. 7-8)
Unable to obtain additional sources (i.e., competition),
the Navy sought to control costs through a FP contract.
Unable to recover invested resources, Bell-Boeing was
committed to the project.
In retrospect, however, the decision may be viewed from
two sides. For the Navy, given the political environment at
the time, a FP contract provided the best alternative to avoid
early cancellation of the program. However, a FP contract
defeated the theoretical purpose of FSD, for if acquisition
personnel knew how to write specifications for a developmental
program then FSD would not be needed. (Smith, 1989, pp. 38-
40)
The management of business operations and technical
development programs becomes more complex as technology
advances. It is virtually impossible for any one
individual - or any one contractor - to comprehend every
aspect of research, engineering design, and production
stages of a major acquisition program. (Fox, 1988, p. 10)
F. STATUS UPDATE
Military department requirements for the V-22 program have
decreased for a variety of reasons, mainly due to budget
constraints. Original requirements and related primary
missions are contained in Table I. (See TABLE I.)
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TABLE I: ORIGINAL V-22 REQUIREMENT (Ryan, 1990, p. 6)
Service Airplanes Purpose
Marine Corps 552 Combat Assault
Navy 350 ASW Warfare/CSAR
Army 231 LR Combat Support
Air Force 80 SOF
Total 1213
Since these original requirements were established, military
departments have reduced or eliminated their involvement in
the program. Currently, the total number of V-22's expected
in the defense inventory is just over half the original
requirements. (See TABLE II.)
TABLE II: CURRENT V-22 REQUIREMENT (Ryan, 1990, p. 6)
| Service Airplanes Purpose
1 Marine Corps 552 Combat Assault
Navy 50 CSAR
Air Force 55 SOF
1 Total 657
21
Note that the Army, the original executive service, has
withdrawn from the program.
A senior executive within Bell Helicopter summarized the
Secretary of Defense's decision to cancel the V-22 as follows:
... Our Secretary of Defense is loudly proclaiming that
the V-22 is too expensive for the military. And in the
next breath, he defends the B2 bomber, which carries 20
times the unit cost of a V-22 and only l/1000th the
probability of being needed. (Norwine, January/February
1990, p. 39)
Several members of Congress also have expressed concern
over the V-22 decision. The House Armed Services Committee
directed the Secretary of Defense to provide with the FY-91
budget request an independent Cost and Operational
Effectiveness Analysis (COEA) of all reasonable V-22
alternatives (Cooper, 1990, p. 4). The House and Senate
Defense Appropriations Conference added additional guidance.
The Secretary of Defense's original decision to cancel the
V-22 was supported by an analysis performed by his Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Program Analysis & Evaluation (PA&E),
Doctor David Chu. Doctor Chu proposed a mixture of CH-53/CH-
60 helicopters that would provide equal lift capability for
less up front cost than the V-22 program6 . "The DoD's
decision to cancel the V-22 was based on the difference
between the $33 billion Cost Level I for 502 tiltrotors versus
The V-22 will cost more over the next five to ten years than the
alternative helicopters because of start up costs.
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the $24 billion Cost Level II for the OSD's proposed
substitute mix" (Bell-Boeing Press Release OJ-1, 1991).
The Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA), tasked with
performing the independent COEA, studied Cost Level I and II,
and determined that a smaller fleet of V-22 airplanes would be
superior to the Cost Level II package (Simmons, et al
.
, 1990,
11). The study found that
the V-22's speed, range, and survivability advantages
could enable even the 356 aircraft fleet to be more
effective - sometimes significantly more and other times
only slightly more - than all the proposed helicopter
alternatives in each of the four Marine missions examined.
Moreover, the fleet of 356 V-22's yields substantial
improvement over the Marines' current capabilities for all
missions. (Simmons, et al
.
, 1990, p. 11)
The study concluded that
at the production rates initially proposed for the V-22,
its higher procurement cost would make it more expensive
over the near term than would be the case with any of the
helicopter alternatives considered in the assessment.
However, if a lower production rate were to be used and
the V-;22 procurement stretched out over a longer period of
time,' then the near-term, costs for the program would be
comparable to those for any other alternatives. (Simmons,
et al
.
, 1990, p. 23)
Despite these findings, the Secretary of Defense's
decision to cancel the program remained. The evolution of the
program has reached an impasse between the Department of
Defense and those in Congress as well as other influential
Because the production facilities for the V-22 have not yet been built,
they could be designed to accommodate a lower production rate than had been
previously planned. Consequently, it should be possible to avoid the unit cost
increases that occur when fixed overhead costs must be spread over a smaller
production lot. (Sirrmons, et al
.
, 1990, p. 23)
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parties who support the program. The Marine Corps still wants
the V-22 but has had to defer to DoD officially.
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III. DUAL-USE TECHNOLOGY AND THE V-22
A. PURPOSE OF CHAPTER
The V-22 represents revolutionary technology, principly
because tiltrotor airplanes do not require a runway and can
fly horizontally like a turboprop airplane. This feature
gives utility of application to both the military and
commercial sectors, i.e., dual-use technology. This chapter
provides information on dual-use technology, a major factor
cited by members of Congress as responsible for their
continued support for development of the V-22.
Using the V-22 as a case example of dual-use technology
provides insight into the following questions: what are the
programmatic and financial implications for the Department of
Defense and commercial industry of dual-use technology? What
role does the Department of Defense play in maintaining the
industrial base? Finally, how do the Department of Defense,
Congress, and contractors view the importance of potential
civilian applications resulting from V-22 technology?
B. DUAL-USE TECHNOLOGY
Quotations by three distinguished observers explain dual-
use technology in general, and tiltrotors in particular:
"History must record that we took charge of our destiny
and left a new generation with a better environment, a
higher quality of life, and greater opportunities. To
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achieve this goal , transportation and transportation
policy can be - must be - a vital agency for change."
President George Bush (NASA Phase II Final Report, 1991)
"We [must] promote technologies that have a useful
application in commercial industry as well as in defense
applications, so the overall cost of new technology is
affordable to both sectors." Senator Sam Nunn (Bell-
Boeing MV-1, 1990, p. 2)
"I am convinced that the tiltrotor is coming without
question. Whether it will be an American-made tiltrotor,
there is some question. .. If we build it, we will become
the only supplier of this thing five years ahead (of the
Europeans and Japanese), and we become an exporter of this
technology. It's going to help our balance of payments;
it's going to help with our industrial base. . .What we
don't want to happen is for this technology to go the same
way as the videocassette recorder technology, which was an
American invention. We're buying them all from Japan now,
it would be a shame if that happened to the tiltrotor."
Jim McDaniel , Senior Federal Aviation Agency (FAA)
Official. (Bell-Boeing point paper, 1990, p. 2)
The final quotation summarizes the opinion of V-22 supporters
in Congress.
Of the many budgeting and programmatic concerns
confronting Congress, decreasing the defense budget while
still maintaining a viable industrial base looms high on their
priority list. For a variety of reasons, e.g., reduced
threat, expanding entitlements and interest on the budget
deficit, the United States must reduce its defense spending.
The Department of Defense finds itself spending more dollars
for fewer airplanes, ships, and tanks (Alic, 1989, p. 2).
Also, based on the latest national security strategy, the
United States will rely increasingly on reconstituted forces,
augmented by a surge capability. Dual-use technology
furnishes one strategy for maximizing waning resources that
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our elected leaders and senior defense executives have
considered. Commitment in Congress to dual-use technology is
strong. Legislation proposed by Senator Jeff Bingaman in the
FY-92 Senate defense authorization bill would, ". . .require the
Department of Defense to devote a larger portion of its
research to 'dual use' technologies that have applications for
both commercial development as well as defense" (Rubin, 1991,
p. 2090).
Defined in simple terms, dual-use technologies find
applications in both defense systems and commercial products 1 .
Gerald Epstein, a notable authority on dual-use technology,
expands on this definition by stating: "We mean not only
artifacts that can be found in both weapons systems and
commercial products but also the underlying knowledge base,
analytical techniques, technical processes, and design and
manufacturing experience by which we apply our knowledge to
solve problems" (Epstein, 1989, p. 4).
It is crucial for the reader to understand that a military
V-22 has no real commercial application. "It is not possible
to merely repaint or tweak the military V-22 to produce a
commercially viable tiltrotor aircraft" (Bell-Boeing MV-1,
1990, p. 1). What the V-22 will provide to commercial
aviation involves the further development of the processes for
Two terms, subsets of the general definition of dual -use technology,
are "spin-off" and "spin-on." Spin-off includes technology transferred from
defense to the commercial sector. Spin-on includes technology transferred from
the commercial sector to defense.
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tiltrotor technology and an incentive to change our national
aviation infrastructure .
Caution must be observed relative to the effective use of
dual-use technology; it requires a policy of tailoring this
aspect of acquisition strategy to each individual program.
Programs encompassing dual -use technology often involve
dynamic systems on the "cutting" edge. Therefore, to quantify
the value of dual-use technology or apply a "template" policy
based on prior experience does not exploit its full potential.
(Carter, 1989, pp. 5-6) In short, dual-use technology is not
applicable to all systems the Department of Defense proposes
to develop. Ashton Carter, of Harvard's Center for Science
and International Affairs, Harvard University, told the House
Armed Services Committee that "the key aim of policy in this
area is to make the defense and commercial technology bases
mutually reinforcing..." (Carter, 1989, p. 1). Gerald
Epstein supports the philosophy advanced by Ashton Carter,
stating, "no matter how much some may wish government to adopt
the practices of the private sector ... there are fundamental
and inherent differences between the government and the
private sector that may prevent substantial integration of the
defense sector with the rest of the economy" (Epstein, 1989,
P. 8).
2 The term "infrastructure" refers to the network of capital facilities,
i.e., airports and vertiports, within the National Airspace System (NAS) . A
vertiport is a small facility, approximately four to six acres, built to
accommodate tiltrotor planes.
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Differences between the military and commercial variant of
the V-22 are significant. The V-22, designed for military
application includes hardening for battlefield survivability
,
a capability for shipboard operations (rotating wing
assembly), and military unique avionics. By contrast, the
civilian derivative would include an upgraded transmission (a
safety feature required for FAA certification), modified cabin
accommodations (again safety/comfort related), civilian-unique
avionics, and a fixed wing assembly. These modifications are
not all-inclusive, but they provide an appreciation of the
fact that the commercial derivative is not a clone of the
military airplane. (NASA Phase II Final Report, 1991, p. 27)
C. HISTORY OF DEFENSE SUPPORT FOR COMMERCIAL INDUSTRY
The next three sections are not directly applicable to the
V-22. Their purpose is to inform on issues confronted by
Congress, the Department of Defense, and defense-commercial
contractors. These issues include problems with our defense
acquisition process and economic vigor both at home and
overseas
.
Before the V-22 and dual-use technology, the Department of
Defense had a long history of advancing technology that,
directly or indirectly, energized the economy and enhanced
A contractor news release linked survivability to saving taxpayer
money: "The V-22's speed and maneuverability. . .makes it up to five times more
survivable in combat situations. . .The Osprey is built to go in harm's way; the
alternatives are not."
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national security. Computers, jet engines, helicopters, and
airplanes representing state-of-the-art technology, firmly
secured the United States as the undisputed leader in "high-
tech," and contributed to an enduring positive trade export.
Department of Defense sponsored research and production has
had a persistent impact on our economy as epitomized by the
following example:
Techniques developed for producing firearms earlier in the
19th century laid the groundwork for mass production of
sewing machines and bicycles, and for the automobile
industry and all that followed. . .Little more than 40 years
after the first electronic digital computers were put to
work calculating artillery firing tables, there were more
processors than people in the world. (Alic, 1989, p. 2)
For the past century, the federal government, and the
Department of Defense in particular, assumed a leadership role
to encourage, support, and produce "revolutionary" technology.
The magnitude of research, in terms of financial
contribution by the Department of Defense, staggers the
imagination
:
...Taking account of only the defense R&D budget probably
understates the portion of the national effort that is
military-related. If one combines direct DOD and DOE
defense contract R&D, ...Independent R&D and Bid and
Proposal expenditures in private industry, and if it takes
estimates made by economists of the amount of private R&D
investment aimed at winning military business, the total
defense-related investment probably adds up to almost half
of the total annual national investment in science and
technology. (Carter, 1989, p. 2)
Since the 1950's several unsettling trends have interceded
in the relationship between defense and commercial industries.
Domestic industry has found itself increasingly subject to
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foreign competitors. Inexpensive labor and modern facilities
have provided foreign competitors with a distinct competitive
advantage. Also, the Department of Defense must rely with
discomfiting frequency on the commercial sector for products
and services for which it set the standards. The problem for
DoD with relying on the commercial sector is that the desire
to conduct business is not always mutual. (Branscomb and
Pratt, 1989, pp. 1-5)
This section does not explain the many factors leading to
the current dilemma, although it provides provocative
background. A once congenial relationship between the
Department of Defense and commercial industry has succumbed to
the pressure of global competition and excessive federal
regulations. These barriers to effective integration of
defense and commercial industries are featured in the next
section
.
D. THE CURRENT STATE OF DEFENSE-COMMERCIAL RELATIONS
In terms of a global market, U.S. products cost too much,
and take too long from concept to production. In short, much
of American industry is fighting for its economic life.
(Alic, 1989, p. 2)
In the past, commercial industry enthusiastically
supported the "performance first" philosophy desired by the
Department of Defense (Carter, 1989, p. 6). Today, there is
parity of technology between defense and commercial firms.
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Therefore, commercial industry may apply discretion as to whom
they'll conduct their business with, i.e., domestic firms,
foreign firms, or the Department of Defense. The decision to
remain predominantly in the defense business is a gamble.
Unfortunately for the Department of Defense, many contractors
now exclusively prohibit business with the government.
Unfavorable risks and excessive bureaucracy simply outweigh
the benefits. To illustrate:
Between 1982 and 1987 the number of US firms making DoD
hardware fell from some 118,000 to under 40,000, most of
the losses (and consequently increased DOD dependance on
imports) in the lower contracting tiers. Project director
J. Blackwell of CSIS (Center for Strategic International
Studies) predicts mid-sized firms will keep shifting from
military to commercial business, and prime contractor will
have trouble finding subcontractors. (Aerospace Daily,
1989, p. 266)
Finally, to illustrate a waning DoD presence in advanced
technology, consider the following fact: "...Private firms now
out-spend the military on R&D by 50 percent and match the
government's total R&D investments" (Branscomb and Pratt,
1989, p. 3).
Healthy technology transfer requires government policies
that foster conducive relationships, e.g., relationships that
result in a tiltrotor airplane that has utility for both
civilian application and the Department of Defense. Yet,
other factors suppress government-commercial interaction.
These barriers include government accounting and auditing
practices, strict (i.e., inflexible) military specifications,
a fixation by the Department of Defense on unlimited data
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rights, defense procurement regulations, and security issues
related to technology breeches. The barriers then reduce,
prevent, or intimidate an increasingly larger portion of the
commercial sector from seeking government contracts. To
comply with administrative and legal regulations, contractors
determined to deal with the government must segregate their
business into defense and non-defense operations, a "luxury"
undertaken with decreasing frequency. (CSIS Study, 1991, pp.
i-vii
)
Dual-use technology carries a price tag. This can lead
the taxpayer to question the merit of government-sponsored
dual-use research and procurement. Dual-use technology
provides its greatest benefit to our nation indirectly (e.g.,
federally sponsored university research), a factor not
particularly appealing to an American public hungry for
tangibl e proof of their tax dollars at work (Carter, 1989, p.
7).
It would be impossible to cost out the financial benefit
resulting from dual-use research that is sponsored by the
federal government. Still, Americans would notice the impact
of dual-use products if daily amenities taken for granted were
suddenly absent. Consider the economic impact of the
following successful defense-commercial partnership:
. .
.
(NASA) worked with a Massachusetts-based company to
develop a process that allowed a reflective metal film
coating to be applied to different materials. The process
had applications within the space program, but it also had
commercial applications from which this company was able
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to profit. The result? The company, which started in
1964 with 16 employees and annual sales just under
$100,000, today employs 55 and has annual sales around $20
million. (Manheim, 1990, p. 19)
E. MAINTAINING THE DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE
The Department of Defense has always played a role in
determining the industrial base. Factors such as a declining
defense budget and the potential for a "peace dividend" seem
destined to upset the traditional role played by DoD.
Therefore, it seems reasonable to question the degree to which
the Department of Defense or the federal government is
obligated to sustain the industrial base. Answers to this
question invoke broad debate. Also, as noted in the previous
section, commercial industry may not embrace development and
production of defense systems with the vigor of previous
endeavors. Obviously this is a complicated issue compounded
by the rapidly changing geopolitical environment.
Still, a market for defense hardware will exist well into
the future. Also, the Department of Defense, for national
security purposes, will be required to identify and retain
critical defense related industries. Therefore, some
dependency will continue despite the apparent divergent paths
of defense and commercial industry. Gerald Epstein testified
before the House Committee on Government Operations,
Subcommittee on Legislation and National Security:
"The Department of Defense finds itself attracting
increasing attention -- much of it sel f -generated -- as
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the possible or principal agent for revitalizing our
commercial technology base. This attention is in part due
to DoD's historical role in pioneering advanced
technol ogy . . . And there is always the lure of what
Professor Lewis Branscomb calls the 'Willy Sutton' theory
of industrial policy, with the Department of Defense being
'where the money is.'" (Epstein, 1989, p. 3)
Ronald Fox, a notable authority on defense acquisition,
summarized succinctly the defense-commercial relationship:
Since the earliest days our nation, the military forces
have relied on private enterprise to supply the material,
equipment, and services needed in peace and war. Although
the government has always manufactured some war materials
- especially ammunition - at no time have the armed forces
been fully independent of the private sector in meeting
their needs. (Fox, 1988, p. 11)
These two quotes underscore the abiding reality that the
defense and commercial sectors are inexorably linked. John
Alic, a member of the Dual-Use Technologies Project at the
Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, furnishes
the following solution for maintaining and enhancing the
defense-commercial relationship:
It seems unlikely that DoD will be judged the right and
proper vehicle for supporting U.S. R&D and technology
development. But by ending the isolation of the defense
industry from the rest of the economy, dual-use policies
could provide and produce cost-effective military systems
during a time of severe budgetary strain. (Alic, 1989, p.
12)
Earlier, it was cautioned to avoid viewing dual-use as a
panacea. Commercial industry concentrates on efficiency and
competitiveness. The Department of Defense concentrates on
capability, performance, and the protection of national
security assets. (Epstein, 1989, p. 8) Frequently, these
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different approaches collide, preventing any meaningful
interaction. Ashton Carter notes:
. . .There may be instances where dual-use is not practical
,
either because technical goals of defense and non-defense
are not similar enough, or when it is not practical to
surmount the non-technical (read political) barriers. In
these cases segregation might be the wisest policy for
both sectors. (Carter, 1989, p. 8)
There is little evidence that dual-use technology is an
important factor in Department of Defense acquisition
strategy. Dual-use technology, in the context of acquisition
strategy, does not "play" well at the Department of Defense.
It is a "micro" issue in a "macro" process. This results from
the long-term orientation of dual-use policy and the short-
term focus of DoD on programs and dollars. (Phoncon Bell-
Boeing PAO Officer, 1991) In short, dual-use technology is a
convenient attribute for a defense system but not a crucial
selling point (Boeing PAO Officer, 1991)'1 .
F. CONGRESSIONAL INVOLVEMENT
Despite a diminishing role as a global high-tech leader,
the United States remains the unquestioned pacesetter for
advanced aviation technology. Domestic aerospace industries
recorded a global trade surplus of $20 billion in 1989.
(Bell-Boeing Point Paper, 1990, p. 1) Considering these
Interestingly, Bell and Boeing, partners in V-22 development, place
different emphasis on the airplane's dual -use potential . Bell extols the virtues
of immediate technology transfer. Boeing's conservative approach emphasizes the
application of the tiltrotor process to the commercial sector. (Phoncon Industry
Analyst, 1991)
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facts, the political appeal of this industry becomes
understandable
.
The following observations characterize congressional
involvement with dual-use technology in general, and the V-22
in particular:
The Japanese Minister of International Trade, after
visiting the Bell plant manufacturing the V-22 in Fort
Worth, Texas was reported to have commented, "If you
produce this aircraft we will buy it, if you do not, I
guarantee you we will build it." (Bell-Boeing TT-1, 1990,
P. 1)
"I'm for the V-22 for several reasons. Number one, I
think it does represent the kind of modernization and
capacity that we need to be able to carry out the missions
that we're going to be called upon in the decade of the
'90s and in the 21st century to perform."
"Secondly, I am very concerned about the technology it
embodies because I really believe that, with military
production and use, that we can develop an aircraft for
commercial use that can be a godsend to us in terms of
commercial transportation." Senator Phil Gramm (Jacovis,
1990, p. 8)
"...At some point, when our principal suppliers [of oil]
in the Middle East are threatened by a neighbor, I think
that you're going to see the United States defend our oil
supplies there... and I think it will come within the
lifetime of an Osprey. I don't mind telling you that in
the back of my mind, I think about that, and I will think
about that as we deliberate and mark this bill up and
decide what we're going to do about the Osprey.' Senator
Dale Bumpers (Jacovis, 1990, p. 8)
Congressional concern over foreign encroachment into the
aerospace industry may be validated. The European share of
rotorcraft manufacturing for the international market has
risen from "just a few percent in the 1950 's to more than 50
Senator Bumpers made these comments prior to operation Desert
Storm/Shield.
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percent today" (Bell-Boeing Point Paper, 1990, p. 1). A
European consortium of five government-owned companies
(EUROFAR) organized to field a civil airplane incorporating
tiltrotor technology. (Bell-Boeing Point Paper, 1990, pp. 1-
2) Also, during this decade, Japanese-owned Ishida
Corporation will build two prototype tiltwing airplanes at a
plant constructed in the "backyard" of Bell's Fort Worth
facility (Bell-Boeing TT-1, 1990, p. 1).
For the reader with a quantitative orientation, consider
the following:
During this decade, the number of air passengers will
increase by 74% and the number of jet transports will
increase 32%, without the increase in infrastructure
support
.
Only three runways are expected to be added to the
nation's ten busiest airports while their operations
increase 21%.
Fifty million hours of lost time to the traveling public
is expected to double in the next decade. (Bell-Boeing
TR-1, 1990, p. 1)
Most congressional support for the V-22 program comes from
congressmen advocating ti 1 trotor technology as opposed to its
strict military appl ication (Phoncon Industry Analyst , 1991).
The programmatic and financial implications of congressional
support, while indirect, have been profound. For reasons
expanded upon in the next chapter, the V-22 program has
survived testing delays and budget cuts because of the
promised spillover economic benefits, for the safety of
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domestic airspace, and for United States national security
(Phoncon Boeing PAO Officer, 1991).
G. FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION (FAA) INVOLVEMENT 6
For a myriad of reasons (e.g., airport congestion, safety,
and economic vitality), the FAA finds itself at the center of
developing commercial tiltrotor (CTR) policies and procedures.
As noted earlier by Jim McDaniel, FAA officials view with
enthusiasm the enormous civil potential represented by the V-
22. The following benefits for civil aviation are argued:
Tiltrotors improve runway efficiency. 56% of the
departures carry 82% of the passengers on trips greater
than 300 miles. 44% of the departures carry 18% of the
passengers on trips less than 300 miles. Tiltrotors would
free-up this runway space, i.e., increased
efficiency/safety for long-duration flights. (Norwine,
March/April 1990, pp. 55-57)
Whereas $4-6 billion is required to build one airport
(assuming site availability), it would cost far less for
a total tiltrotor system, including aircraft development
and production together with 18 vertiports. (Norwine,
March/April 1990, pp. 55-57)
Developers of commercial tiltrotor airplanes read FAA
commitment toward civilian certification as a litmus test of
their future development effort (Fisher, 1991, p. 2). The
establishment of a Civil Tiltrotor Program Office under the
FAA, a memorandum of agreement (MOA) between the FAA and the
The FAA will develop policy and certification requirements for
commercial tiltrotor (CTR) application. However, the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration (NASA) actively contributes to advancing CTR technology.
Too, credit the Port Authority of New York/New Jersey for their involvement
researching the tiltrotor infrastructure at the metropolitan level.
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Department of Defense to allow concurrent testing, and the
FAA-sponsored Port Authority of New York/New Jersey Study
encourage continued tiltrotor research by our national
aerospace industries. Still, the commercial tiltrotor
industry cannot carry the entire burden of tiltrotor
development
:
"For the tiltrotor to reach its full potential and place
in aviation history, the FAA has to lead in the
development and fielding of a safe and efficient system of
vertiports ... There is no private business or manufacturer
who can legally lead in this effort." (Fisher, 1991, p.
5)
The financial implications, albeit indirect, if the V-22
becomes part of the military inventory are considerable. "FAA
certification of the tiltrotor without a military version is
estimated to cost $1.3 billion, nearly four times more than
the $350 million that would be required given Defense
Department procurement of the aircraft" (Bell-Boeing MV-1,
1990, p. 1). Civilian requests for tiltrotor airplanes in the
40 seat range exceed 2,600 individual units (NASA Phase II
Final Report, 1991, p. 26). It is argued that the large
number of potential foreign sales translates to an economic
benefit of between $10-15 billion by the year 2010 (Bell-
Boeing U-l, 1990, p. 2)
.
H. CLOSING COMMENTS
The purpose of this chapter is to provide information on
the national economic benefit of V-22 development due to
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dual-use application. The skeptic may postulate that if the
V-22 represents such promising technology for civil aviation,
commercial interests should fund and develop it independent of
DoD. The answer is that, "Commercial customers simply cannot
and will not take the enormous financial and operational risks
of an unproven new aircraft: they want enough operational
experience to verify safety, reliability, and operational
costs and characteristics" (Bell-Boeing MV-1, 1990, p. 1).
Also, commercial industry awaits the results of operational
testing of military airplanes to establish market credibility
(Bell-Boeing MV-1, 1990, p. 1). A military airplane first is
not without precedent, e.g., the Bell 204 through 214 series
commercial helicopters and the Boeing 707 commercial jet
(Bell-Boeing COM-1, 1990, p. 1). Clearly, industry and others
believe a civil tiltrotor built by domestic firms requires
government subsidization to some degree. It is difficult to
see how it could be funded independent of DoD input.
Many reasons are advanced for continuing V-22 development,
i.e., a military version first:
• The federal government has expended $2.2 billion in V-22
development. Private investment exceeds $200 million.
(Bell-Boeing TT-1, 1990, p. 1)
• The first airplane will cost a fortune. It takes quantity
of production to take advantage of a learning curve
effect. Because the military will procure in excess of
600 airplanes, the expected cost to commercial airlines
will become acceptable. (Phoncon Bell-Boeing Marketing
Director, 1991)
• Over 30 cost/benefit studies (both military and
commercial) on the V-22 have unequivocally found the
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airplane to be more capable and efficient per dollar than
conventional helicopter alternatives (Phoncon Bell-Boeing
Marketing Director, 1991). Notable cost/benefit studies
include those sponsored or conducted by NASA, IDA,
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), and the New
York/New Jersey Port Authority.
Europe's EUROFAR, Japan's Ishida Corporation, and the
Soviet Union's Mil Design Bureau are government subsidized,
i.e., nationalized ventures in a race to develop and market a
tiltrotor airplane. According to Crawford Brubaker, former
Assistant Secretary of Commerce, "whoever captures the tilt-
rotor market can anticipate at least $500 million per year in
sales in the next decade" (Brubaker, 1990, p. 77). Unlike
their American counterparts, foreign industry is not dominated
by the need for an immediate return on investment (ROI)
(Phoncon Bell-Boeing Marketing Director, 1991). Producing
tiltrotor airplanes is such a high risk yet financially
lucrative investment that foreign governments are willing to
subsidize continued development.
To summarize, dual -use technology may provide a useful
systems acquisition justification for the United States
government, but it must be tailored to the subject program,
i.e., to avoid the "template" mentality. Barriers to
effective integration of the defense and commercial sectors
will continue given current regulations and other factors.
The V-22 is a robust example of dual-use technology that may
be argued is needed to enhance our economic competitiveness
and national security.
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IV. BUDGET HISTORY OF THE V-22
A. PURPOSE OF CHAPTER
The V-22 is no stranger to controversy. In fact, one
newspaper columnist appropriately likened the scrutiny of the
V-22 to a blistering by the sun. He went on to state:
Indeed, no defense program in recent years has been more
challenged, scrutinized, abused, evaluated, debated,
abused, analyzed, cost-benef itized, test flown,
prototyped, and then abused again. There's been, in fact,
so much sunlight, the program seems blistered by it.
(Harvey, 1991, p. 46)
The intent of this chapter is to provide insight to the
decisions made by the "players" involved with the V-22
program. To that end, the final two chapters of this thesis
address the following questions: First, what does the V-22
teach us with respect to defense budgeting? Second, what
are/were the roles and relationships between the military
departments, the Department of Defense, contractors, and the
Congress in budgeting for the V-22? Finally, what are the
program the political competition between the Secretary of
Defense, Congress, and other interested parties in financial
terms, and in terms of the future of the V-22? Answers to
these questions are provided, in part, by a review of
congressional action on the V-22 program.
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B. BUDGET EVENTS 1982 - 1988
Chapter II and Appendix (A) provide a chronological
history of the V-22 program and the evolution of tiltrotor
technology. In FY-82, the JVX program received initial
funding from Congress to begin development. During the
subsequent years, program funding increased incrementally as
preliminary design graduated to full scale development. From
the period beginning in FY-82 and continuing through FY-88,
Congress appropriated approximately $1,824 billion for the V-
22 program. Appendix (B) gives the reader a comprehensive
matrix of congressional action taken on the V-22. Through
1987 the V-22 program experienced "normal" congressional
action; however, other significant events would ultimately
impact the V-22 program.
1. The utility of joint procurement programs
On the surface, joint procurement programs seem
advantageous. The Department of Defense may realize
substantial savings by procurement of a major system suitable
to mission requirements of more than one service branch by
exploiting economies of scale. The benefits received through
mass production may offset the limits of funding allotted to
each service.
This must be tempered, however, by resisting attempts
to force a service to except a weapon they don't want. The
High Mobility Multi-purpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) provides
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a good example of such a pitfall. Both the Army and the
Marine Corps purchased HMMWV ' s . However, the Marines CH-46 is
not configured to carry the HMMWV internally or externally.
This leaves the Marine CH-53E as the only helicopter capable
of transporting a HMMWV. (Phoncon CBO Analyst, 1991)
From the beginning, the V-22 was designed and promoted
as a joint airplane. With minor modification, the airplane
would satisfy the Joint Services Operational Requirement
(JSOR) of the three participating military services. Its
utility for broad application, increased capability, and
promotion of advanced aerospace technology underlined the
theme of this period. (Bell-Boeing Press Release TVA-1, 1990)
The reality of joint programs provides an ironic twist
to this situation. As resources, particularly in the Program
Objective Memorandum (POM) years, became more restricted, the
military services' become increasingly selective. As the time
drew closer to "pay the bill," the scrutiny of individual
programs seemed to grow exponentially. This is exactly what
occurred with the V-22 when the Army withdrew from the program
in the Spring of 1983. (Phoncon Bell-Boeing Business
Development Manager, 1991)
2. The Army withdrawal
There are at least two reasons why the Army cancelled
their JVX requirement. The first centers on the decision to
make the Light Helicopter Experiment (LHX) their number one
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aircraft priority. The Army could not afford both the LHX and
the V-22. With the CH-47 (Chinook) in inventory, their heavy-
lift requirement could be met in the future. (Phoncon Bell-
Boeing PAO Officer, 1991) Further, the Army felt it important
to show unanimity for one system in view of the mood of
Congress and a declining defense department budget (Phoncon
Bell-Boeing Supervisor Naval Requirements and Marketing
Director, 1991)
.
The second reason might appropriately be called
"board-room" tactics. The Army had sacrificed other programs
to retain the LHX (Phoncon Bell-Boeing PAO Officer, 1991).
They knew the Marine Corps, out of necessity to replace the
CH-46, would continue to lobby hard for the V-22 (Phoncon
Bell-Boeing PAO Officer, 1991). At some future date, the Army
felt it could reenter the V-22 program and ultimately end up
with both airplanes.
Whatever the reason, the Army's decision produced a
major impact on the V-22 program. When the Army cancelled, it
eliminated the requirement for 231 aircraft. As expected, the
unit cost of the remaining airplanes ordered escalated
dramatically. So profound was the effect of this decision
that when the Secretary of Defense later testified to the
House Armed Services Committee on his rationale for
cancellation of the V-22 program, he stated that if "the Army
were seriously interested in the V-22, that would help
significantly in . . . reducing the unit cost of the system and
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justifying the investment that would be required" (Cooper,
1991, p. 3).
3. Political events relevant to cancellation of the V-22
From a military perspective, the Reagan
administration's attitude toward defense spending was a
welcomed relief compared to the relatively austere times
associated with the previous administration. President
Reagan's Secretary of Defense, Caspar Weinberger, was
extremely supportive of most major weapons systems. Perhaps
this support bordered on the extreme in that he eventually
lost credibility with, and patience of, Congress. (Lopez,
1989, p. 4)
The Department of Defense budget attained its post
WWII peacetime apex during FY-85. Following this, a series of
events created a declining defense budget. First was the
escalation of the federal deficit. In the face of
unprecedented peacetime deficits, the Administration continued
requesting growth for the defense department - severely
testing the patience of Congress. Second, in October of 1987
the stock market crash effectively turned the public's
attention back to fiscal reality. Finally, in 1989, the first
of two Bipartisan Budget Summit Agreements signaled a formal
shift in national policy. Before departing office, President
Reagan submitted a budget to Congress with two percent real
growth for defense. (Lopez, 1989, p. 3)
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When President Bush came into office he sought to
appease Congress by proposing a one year freeze on defense
spending. This meant that the Pentagon would be forced to
reduce its original FY-90 request by six billion dollars.
(Lopez, 1989, p. 3)
President Bush also had difficulty receiving approval
for his nomination of John Tower to the position of Secretary
of Defense. The bitter and protracted Tower nomination debate
resulted in the vacancy of the chief executive position at the
Pentagon for nearly four months. Representative Richard
Cheney became the Secretary of Defense in April of 1989. He
encountered two problems requiring immediate attention.
First, the President had committed the Pentagon to budget
reduction, compounded by the second summit agreement,
resulting in a net budget reduction at the Department of
Defense of ten billion dollars for FY-90.
The second hurdle addressed the quality of leadership.
Secretary Cheney was the second choice of the President. It
became imperative to the Administration's success that
Secretary Cheney establish firm control of the Department of
Defense. (Lopez, 1989, pp. 3-4)
For reasons to be discussed in a subsequent portion of
this chapter, Secretary Cheney opted to cancel the V-22
program. Because cutting at the margins is less effective
than cancellation of "big ticket" programs, the V-22's sizable
budget was too tempting to resist. Also, Secretary Cheney
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received advice from his staff that the V-22 was not cost-
effective .
C. V-22 BUDGET EVENTS OF FY- 8
9
The remaining fiscal years, 1989 through 1992, will be
analyzed by fiscal year, according to congressional action
taking place during the particular period.
1. Congressional action
Fiscal Year 1989 resulted in the largest amount of R&D
funds appropriated for the V-22 program, at $667 million. In
addition, both the House Armed Services Committee and the
Senate Armed Services Committee authorized $355 million for
procurement of twelve pilot production airplanes*. The Senate
Armed Services Committee Authorization Act referenced a
potential decision by the Navy to delay the V-22 for a year.
The Committee directed that if the Secretary of Defense
supported such a decision by the Navy, authorized V-22
procurement funding could only be transferred to other Marine
Corps procurement. (SASC Report No. 100-326, 1988, p. 29)
The appropriation committees concurred with the
authorization language, but the House Appropriations Committee
Bill evidenced additional congressional concern over the V-22:
1 Pilot production planes are essentially the planes the services will
take delivery on with minimal modification. The acquisition strategy called for
eight planes to be built jointly by Bell and Boeing. Each company would then
build two planes independently. The government would subsequently award a
contract for future lots to the lowest bidder. (Phoncon Bell -Boeing PAD Officer,
1991)
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As the program evolved over the past few years, many
changes have taken place. The Committee believes that
this gives cause to reevaluate all aspects of the V-22
procurement strategy, including annual procurement rates
and the decision to tool-up both contractors to give them
the capability of building the entire V-22 aircraft. (HAC
Report No. 100-681, 1988, pp. 96-97)
The report defined certain actions Congress "expected" to be
undertaken by the Department of Defense, i.e., submitting a
revised acquisition strategy and the request for six V-22's
(minimum) in the administration's FY-90 budget. This language
signals a detectable increase in Congress' attempt at
management of the V-22 program. Comprehensive figures on
congressional action taken in FY-89 may be found in Appendix
(B).
D. V-22 BUDGET EVENTS OF FY-90
This section will address the decision by Secretary Cheney
to cancel the V-22, the effects of this decision, and
congressional action taken in response.
1. The decision to cancel the V-22
In April of 1989, the Secretary of Defense recommended
canceling the V-22 program and provided as an alternative a
mixture of upgraded conventional helicopters to reassure both
the Navy and Marine Corps (Simmons et al . , 1990, p. 1).
Secretary Cheney proposed procurement of 703 CH-60's
(Blackhawk) and CH-53E's (Sea Stallion). His testimony
concluded that this action alone would save the Department of
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Defense seven billion dollars in the POM (Jacovis, 1990, p.
1).
Reaction from advocates of the V-22 program over the
decision to cancel was immediate. Frustrated by the timing
and secrecy of the cancellation decision, supporters of the V-
22 program in Congress criticized the "incompleteness" of the
PA&E analysis. V-22 proponents claimed this price and
configuration analysis didn't consider life-cycle cost, or
design features built into the V-22 to enhance the efficiency,
survivability, and reliability over the CH-60/CH-53E mixture.
(Center for Strategic Policy Report No. 90-16, 1990, p. 3) On
why the V-22 program was cancelled, a report published by the
Center for Security Policy commented: "...the answer lies in
the convergence of budgetary pressures on the one hand and, on
the other, the over-reliance of a new Secretary of Defense on
the advice of key subordinates with a penchant for
shortsighted, penny-wise and pound-foolish approaches to
managing defense programs and operations" (Center for
Strategic Policy Report No. 90-16, 1990, p. 2).
The military chiefs of the Army, Navy, and Marine
Corps lobbied hard in their limited time before Secretary
Cheney to continue V-22 development. Alternatives to the
Secretary's proposal were prepared; however, it is unclear
whether the Secretary of Defense ever formally considered
them. (Phoncon Bell-Boeing JPO, 1991) In fact, the Marines
identified specific offsets (e.g., the PA&E helicopter
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alternative and the M-l tank) in addition to a proposal by the
contractors to restructure the V-22 program to reduce up-front
cost (Center for Strategic Policy Report No. 90-16, 1990, p.
4). However, the Secretary of Defense remained adamant.
Some proponents of the V-22 program advance the
opinion that Secretary Cheney's decision was purely political
and stemmed from a disagreement between the Secretary and
House Representative Jim Wright (Phoncon Bell-Boeing JPO,
1991). This opinion should not come as a surprise, because
generic to any major systems acquisition are the customary
"pork" and "turf" considerations. Therefore, the reason for
the cancellation decision may never be known. But it is
evident that Secretary Cheney and some members of Congress
were and still are at odds over national strategy and the
military hardware required to counter the threat on future
battlefields
.
a. The effects of cancellation
Assuming the V-22 enters production at some point,
total program costs have increased from an estimated $22.3
billion, when the program was deleted, to $25.4 billion
(Ferber, 1991, pp. 3-4) . Developmental problems, testing
schedule slippages, advancing technology (e.g., software
modifications), contract modifications, inflation, and
2 Both figures are in 1990 dollars to procure 657 airplanes. Refer to
Chapter II, TABLE II.
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uncertainty by the contractors to receive V-22 production
funding caused them to slow their efforts. These factors have
resulted in a FSD contract that is at least two years behind
the original Milestone IIIA (pilot production) decision point
of December 1989 (Ferber, 1991, p. 7).
Further, "...when DOD terminated long-lead
procurement, Bell/Boeing retained funds to cover termination
costs - currently $78 million" (Ferber, 1991, pp. 6-7). The
original FP contract required the contractor to pay $600
million for tooling costs and for DoD to pay $300 million.
When the contract was terminated the Navy had to waive this
clause. Finally, cancellation of procurement contracts voided
the "not to exceed" options (NTE's), effectively eliminating
any guarantee on a fixed unit cost. (Phoncon Bell-Boeing
Business Development Manager, 1991) Again, assuming the V-22
enters production at some point, the options and clauses noted
above will have to be renegotiated - obviously a more
expensive undertaking compared to the original FP contract.
At the time of cancellation, the V-22 was projected
to cost approximately $28 million (FY-90 dollars) per
airplane. The unit cost for the airplane is now approximately
$45 million for the following three reasons. First, delays in
the program have shifted production three years to the right.
A principle effect on cost was inflation. Second, the annual
production rate is expected to top out at between 60 - 72
airplanes per year once production is at full scale. This
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results in a additional six years of production. Third is the
reduced ramp-up, i.e., advantages gained from learning curve
effects are lost. (Phoncon Bell-Boeing Business Development
Manager, 1991) Thus there are arguments for a more thorough
review of the cancellation decision.
Yet the non-quantitative effects of the V-22
provide the most interesting insight. For reasons to be
explained in detail in the remainder of this chapter, the
interaction of the human element - Congress, the military
departments, contractors, and the Department of Defense -
influences conclusions on the V-22 budget. What becomes
obvious is that even technically sound, efficient, and
promising weapon system programs are not guaranteed for
approval . The progress and success of a program are driven by
the human element reacting to the current political and
budgetary climate.
2. Congressional reaction to the cancellation decision
Fiscal Year 1990 proved an extremely busy period for
congressional action on the V-22 program, in particular for
advocates of the program. What ultimately became the
Tiltrotor Coalition in Congress began taking form as
bipartisan alliances, with their foundation in the pork barrel
based on technological advances represented by the V-22. The
coalition organized to obtain continued funding for the V-22
production despite the decision by the Secretary of Defense to
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cancel it. Coalition proponents emphasized modernization of
conventional vice strategic forces. For his part, the
Secretary of Defense remained staunchly opposed to the
program, as reflected by the absence of a request for V-22
funding in the DoD budget. However, while Congress was not
willing to support procurement, it became unequivocally
committed to continued development.
In its FY-90 bill and report, the House Armed Services
Committee authorized $351 million for R&D and $157 million to
preserve options for procurement of 12 pilot production
airplanes. Also, the Committee reduced the administration's
request to buy additional CH-53E's by $157 million.
Interestingly, House Armed Services Committee Chairmen
Representative Les Aspin supported Secretary Cheney's
cancellation decision. Chairman Aspin lost considerable
support because of this decision and the following year he
reversed his opinion, citing advances to be gained for the
aerospace industry and the results of the IDA study. (Towell,
September 1990, p. 2782)
A concerned House Armed Services Committee directed
the Secretary of Defense
"to provide with the FY1991 budget request an independent
cost and operational effectiveness analysis of all
reasonable V-22 alternatives including but not limited to,
the CH-53E, BV-360, EH-101, CH-46E,CH-60 aircraft or any
combination thereof." Noting that the program was 8
months behind schedule and had experienced procurement
cost growth, the committee reasoned that "program
termination is not warranted" because "the magnitude of
the delay and the technical problems are not unusual in
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such a program," and the cost growth "results from the
cancellation by the Army of its purchase of the aircraft
and the Navy stretch out of its purchase of aircraft."
(Cooper, 1991, p. 4)
The other defense committees, by reference to this language,
supported the necessity for the study and tied future funding
to results of the analysis.
The Senate Armed Services Committee noted Secretary
Cheney's concern for a large price tag for the V-22's "narrow"
missions; however, the Committee itself was concerned with
broader implications (i.e., the impact to civil aviation, the
potential for export, and the two billion dollars already
invested). The Committee authorized $255 million for R&D,
along with a sense-of -Congress amendment "urging" the
President to continue the V-22 program. (SASC Report No. 101-
81, 1989, pp. 46-48)
The Senate Armed Services Committee did not authorize
procurement funding. Nevertheless, they directed the
Secretary of Defense to address four questions to be resolved
before procurement. The first of these concerned the
potential tiltrotor technology for civil aviation. Second,
the contractors were "challenged" to support their claims of
potential of civil application by providing concrete evidence
of interest. Third, the Secretary of Defense and the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA) were asked to appraise export
potential , including steps the Department of Defense and other
government agencies would take to foster the commercial
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potential in international markets. Finally, the Secretary of
Defense was asked to examine "innovative alternative
arrangements" for production of the V-22 and to suggest
introducing Total Quality Management (TQM) into the program.
(SASC Report No. 101-81, 1989, pp. 46-48)
The Senate Armed Services Committee concluded by
directing the military department secretaries to reevaluate
the V-22 potential . The Committee became interested in the
application of amphibious operations and directed the Joint
Chief of Staff to "coordinate an examination of the roles and
missions of all amphibious forces and the special operations
missions." (SASC Report No. 101-81, 1989, p. 48)
The conference on the authorization bills concurred
with the amount authorized by the Senate Armed Services
Committee. Comments were limited, centering mainly on the
potential military and civilian application of the V-22, but
they also noted that the cost of the program "may prove
unaf f ordable." (Cooper, 1991, p. 5)
The House Appropriations Committee appropriated $351
million for R&D and $157 million for long-lead procurement.
The Senate Appropriations Committee appropriated $255 million
for continued development but no funding to gear up for
production. Also, both the Senate Appropriations Committee
and the Senate Armed Services Committee rejected $157 million
for procurement of CH-53E airplanes.
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Like the other defense committees, conferees for
appropriations recognized the commercial potential of the V-22
and understood that commercial application was not likely
without military development first. The conference committee
"...expressed 'keen regret' that the program is jeopardized at
a time when our military planning must be tailored to account
for change in the strategic environment." (House Report No.
101-345, 1989, pp. 72-73)
The conference committee for appropriations argued
that the results of the IDA study should be used to base
future decisions as to whether to begin production in FY-91.
The Committee also stressed the importance of obligating FY-89
long-lead procurement dollars to preserve production options.
Finally, like the other defense committees, the appropriation
conference provided the Secretary of Defense with a list of
questions on the V-22 to be analyzed, and directed his
department to report back within six months.
Review of the V-22 program by Congress became
increasingly frequent and detailed. Congress, still agitated
by the Secretary of Defense's decision to cancel the V-22
program, provided increasingly restrictive language with
respect to the V-22 program (Phoncon OLA Military
Representative, 1991). Further, as usual Congress was
compelled to question the military equipment and strategy
postulated by the Department of Defense. The V-22, a long-
term, major systems acquisition program, became progressively
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subjected to short-term resource decisions resulting from
budget cuts and a Congress interested in minute details.
Comprehensive figures on congressional action taken in FY-90
are found in Appendix (B).
E. V-22 BUDGET EVENTS OF FY- 91
This section addresses continued resistance by the
Department of Defense to obligating funds previously
appropriated by Congress. Decisions rendered by the General
Accounting Office and the United States Comptroller General on
the propriety of this deferral , and the effect of the FY-91
Dire Emergency Supplemental Bill are examined. Finally,
congressional action taken in FY-91 on the V-22 is summarized.
1. Department of Defense involvement
The Department of Defense FY-91 budget request
proposed taking approximately $1.4 billion in FY-90 defense
programs and spending it on other programs DoD considered more
important (Fessler, 1990, p. 335). The request contained no
new funding for the V-22 program. The Department of Defense
Comptroller stated, "we ain't going to spend the money" for
the purposes intended by Congress (Fessler, 1990, p. 335).
The proposed deferrals and transfers involved programs
some members of Congress felt strongly about. Congress
perceived this to be an attempt by the Administration to
control the purse strings - long the exclusive domain of
Congress. Said one Senate Appropriations Committee staffer,
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"if they can get away with it, it's tantamount to a line-item
veto." (Fessler, 1990, p. 335)
After the decision to cancel the V-22 program, the
Department of Defense Comptroller withheld $200 million in FY-
89 procurement funding previously appropriated by Congress.
Three events effectively forced the Secretary of Defense to
release these funds to the Naval Air Systems Command. First,
a General Accounting Office review concluded that the
Department of Defense deferral was unauthorized because:
...the conferees on FY1990 authorizations had permitted
the obligation of FY1989 procurement funds by rejecting
Senate language to prohibit the use of prior-year
procurement funds. The Impoundment Control Act, in GAO's
view, does not authorize the Administration to substitute
its policy choices for those of Congress on grounds of
establishing "a contingency against incurring additional
unnecessary costs," as DOD justified its de-obligation
action. (Cooper, 1991, p. 5)
Second, the Senate Appropriations Committee, in its
FY-91 report, cited a decision by the Comptroller General of
the United States that the Department of Defense decision to
impound FY-89 advanced procurement was unauthorized. The
Committee noted, "...that the decision of the DOD to impound
the fiscal year 1989 funds has had an adverse impact on the
program's production schedule and overall cost." (SAC Report
No. 101-521, 1990, p. 195)
Finally, a rider tacked on to the FY-91 Dire Emergency
Supplemental Bill directed the Department of Defense to
obligate the $200 million of FY-89 funds within 60 days or by
May 9, 1991 (Ferber, 1991, p. 6). The Department of Defense
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Comptroller subsequently complied with provisions in this
bill, indicating that the money would be used to fix weight
related problems on the V-22.
To synopsize the notable events occurring in FY-91, it
appears the V-22 became less a programmatic issue, i.e., a
program that Congress chose to support based only on the
plane's advanced aviation capability. The V-22 program became
the locus of a battle over the separation of power between the
executive and legislative branches. The disagreement between
the Secretary of Defense and Congress abated only after
intervention by external agencies and passage of a
Supplemental Bill. Even now, contempt, skepticism, and
tension remain high. Both sides seemed poised for additional
conflict. However, language in FY-92 congressional reports




It is useful to set the stage with respect to the mood
of Congress before expanding on specific congressional action
in FY-91. In 1989, Representative Les Aspin, Chairman of the
House Armed Services Committee, and Senator Sam Nunn, Chairman
of the Senate Armed Services Committee, had previously
provided the Administration, via Secretary Cheney and General
Colin Powell, stern advice on Congress' view of the military
strategy for the future. They criticized the FY-90 defense
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budget as undynamic, consisting of cosmetic changes, and,
above all, oblivious to the political transformation occurring
throughout the Soviet bloc. Congress expected the
Administration to return the following year (FY-91) with a
more realistic strategy for the future threat.
For FY-91, the House Armed Services Committee
authorized $238 million for R&D for the V-22, $165 million in
new procurement, and $200 million in deferred FY-89
procurement funds. They directed that the $365 million for
procurement be applied to support a V-22 pilot production
option in FY-92. The rationale cited by the Committee
included the large sunk cost, flight test results, and
"generally" favorable results of the IDA study. A skeptical
Committee made the following comment in support of the new
funding for R&D: "...the Department of Defense has chosen to
ignore Congress' directives in the development of this
aircraft and has chosen, instead, other programs that do not
appear to consider the changing world environment...." (HASC
Report No. 101-665, 1990, p. 160)
For its part, the Senate Armed Services Committee took
a passive approach toward immediate production of the V-22,
opting instead for continued testing. The Committee noted the
waning maintainability and safety of the CH-46; however, it
refrained from authorizing additional procurement funding for
the V-22, citing concern for problems with weight, vibration,
and compatibility. Additionally, the Committee members viewed
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V-22 production at this point to be "premature" and to violate
the principle of "fly before buy." 3 (SASC Report No. 101-384,
1990, p. 73)
The Senate Armed Services Committee's final report
authorized a total of $238 million, including $200 million in
FY-89 funds and $38 million in new funds. The Committee
recommended that these funds be transferred to R&D to
"...reduce the uncertainties associated with developing and
producing this innovative aircraft" (Cooper, 1991, p. 6).
Finally, the Committee addressed the "crusade" by Secretary
Cheney to kill the V-22 program and, indirectly, noted its
annoyance with his alternative by dramatically reducing
funding for CH-53E hel icopters* . (Towell, July 1990, pp.
2430-2431)
The Conference Committee authorized $238 million for
continued R&D but expressly prohibited use of these funds for
R&D of "alternative" airplanes (House Report No. 101-923,
1990, p. 27). The Committee authorized $165 million from Navy
procurement to be combined with the $200 million (R&D) in FY-
89 funds for advanced procurement of "production
7
"Fly before buy" is a nebulous definition, often subjected to politics
and double standards. Technically it indicates completion of initial operational
testing prior to production. (Phoncon Bell -Boeing Business Manager, 1991)
Developmental models already have logged more than 500 flying hours, meeting the
Pentagon's standard for "fly before buy" (Scarborough, 1991, p. 4).
The Senate Armed Services Committee authorized procurement of CH-53E's
in support of Naval Reserve requirements only.
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representative" airplanes, and support equipment to continue
operational testing (House Report No. 101-923, 1990, p. 23).
The House Appropriations Committee echoed the amounts
authorized by the House Armed Services Committee. However,
language contained in the House Appropriations Committee
report reflected the Committee's frustration with perceived
procrastination by the Department of Defense. For example,
the Committee "expected" the Department of Defense to release
FY-89 funds immediately and the Committee "expected" the Navy
to enter contracts "expeditiously" to support procurement of
four airplanes in FY-92. (HAC Report No. 101-822, 1990, p.
126)
The Senate Appropriations Committee agreed in
principle with the amounts authorized by the Senate Armed
Services Committee. Senate Appropriations Committee language
explicitly addressed the disposition of the CH-53E
alternative, stating that, "the funding was not required with
the continuation of the V-22 program" (Senate Report No. 101-
521, 1990, p. 195). The House and Senate appropriation
conferees agreed to appropriate the amount authorized in
conference, but added an additional $15 million for Air Force,
Special Operation Forces (SOF) development.
Issues present throughout debate in this fiscal year,
and conspicuous in all Committee reports, included the
necessity to capitalize on the V-22's civil potential, and the
cavalier attitude toward Congress expressed by senior
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executives within the Department of Defense. Nevertheless,
the funding instability created by this situation only
aggravates long-term production plans from the view of V-22
supporters. Comprehensive figures on congressional action
taken in FY-91 may be found in Appendix (B) .
F. V-22 BUDGET EVENTS OF FY-92
By most accounts, FY-92 will be the crucial decision year
for the V-22 program. Indirectly, the fate of this program
could rest in decisions made by Congress on the B-2 Bomber and
the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) - both expensive
programs with supporters in Congress and the Department of
Defense. Language in the FY-92 Committee reports contains
ample posturing, allowing room for the expected compromise in
conference
.
The House Armed Services Committee report offers the most
optimism for V-22 proponents. This bill, if approved in
conference, funds three additional "production-like"
airplanes 5 in FY-92, and provides both Congress and Secretary
Cheney with the politically appealing position of not having
to approve actual production. Also, language in the House
In the case of V-22, "production- like" aircraft, with minimal
modification, will be the same aircraft the Marine Corps takes delivery on. In
accordance with recently updated Department of Defense acquisition instructions,
the V-22 must complete a full scale engineering and manufacturing development
phase ; hence, the terminology of production-like aircraft built with production-
like tooling. Language in congressional reports is simply agreeing with the new
instructions.
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Armed Services Committee report will shift the cost of six
production airplanes to R&D. This action dramatical ly reduces
the apparent unit cost of a V-22 airplane - particularly
important as the cost-per-unit had become prohibitive
(Phoncon Industry Analyst, 1991).
Informal indicators, i.e., unofficial opinions by military
and industry personnel assigned to the V-22 program, point to
sufficient funding for the V-22 in FY-92 (Phoncon Bell-Boeing
JPO, 1991). However, the rhetoric from members of the House
Armed Services Committee is far from conciliatory.
Accusations of "deliberate stalling" and "defying
congressional mandate" are not uncommon (Koszczuk, 1991, p.
F-l). Representative George Darden commented:
"You're playing games, and I don't see how you can sit
there with a straight face... If you wanted this thing it
would have flown all over Desert Storm. What we've got
here is deliberate stalling on a project that Congress
wants" (Koszczuk, 1991, p. F-l).
Representative George Hochbrueckner warned the Department of
Defense that, ". . .if building the V-22 becomes a test of wills
with the Bush administration, Congress will prevail"
(Koszczuk, 1991, p. F-l). He went on to say:
"This plane is going to happen. If it's a little
overweight, if it's 4 knots too slow, who cares? We need
it. We're going to do it, with or without the
administration" (Koszczuk, 1991, p. F-l).
With this information as background, congressional action is
provided in the next section.
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1. Congressional action
The Department of Defense again requested zero new
funding for the V-22 in 1991, opting instead for a general
provision that would merge FY-91 production funds and R&D
funds into continued development (HASC Report No. 102-60, p.
145). The House Armed Services Committee report indicated
some misgivings with the proposal, stating:
The committee is concerned that the department's plan for
continuation of the V-22 aircraft development resolve the
technical and performance issue and confirm the
producibil ity of the V-22. The committee believes the V-
22 aircraft development program should be restructured to
make use of the experience gained to date in development
and testing of the V-22 aircraft, resolve and demonstrate
technical issues. . .The committee believes further that the
aircraft used for these operational tests should be
manufactured on hard or production-like tooling to
validate the production process. (HASC Report No. 102-60,
1991, p. 145)
Before actual production, the Committee wanted
airplanes to be built under simulated production conditions,
and under the Full Scale Development (FSD) umbrella. They
view this direction as a "prudent and fiscally responsible
approach to validation of the manufacturing process and
confirmation of the operational suitability of the V-22
aircraft" (HASC Report No. 102-60, 1991, p. 145).
The House Armed Services Committee recommended a total
authorization of $990 million in funding for FY-92 to support
production of three airplanes, and $755 million in FY-93 for
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another three airplanes . The FY-92 authorization provides
$625 million in new R&D funding and recommends transferring
$365 million in prior year funds to R&D.
The Senate Armed Services Committee noted some
significant aspects of justification for the V-22 program,
highlighting the need to replace the Marines CH-46
"immediately," and its concern over the crash of V-22 airplane
number five on June 11, 1991 . The Committee also commented
on the V-22's technical uncertainty, noting that the airplane
requires continued development before production.
Accordingly, the Senate Armed Services Committee authorized
zero new funding, and directed $365 million of prior year
funds for continued development. (SASC Report No. 102-113,
1991, pp. 115-116)
Referencing the IDA study that recommended procurement
of 356 V-22's, the Committee noted the potential for a reduced
requirement for deck space aboard amphibious ships. On the
premise that less amphibious shipping would be an indirect
effect, the Committee directed the Secretary of Defense to
report to the defense committees on the feasibility of
A revised contract for production- like aircraft calls for a buy of 3-3-
4 beginning in 1992 (Phoncon Bell -Boeing Business Manager, 1991). The new
contract will be cost-plus because the Navy lost the option for a fixed price
airplane when the Secretary of Defense ordered the program canceled.
On Tuesday, June 11, 1991, at approximately 6:08 p.m., V-22 flight
development Aircraft #5 crashed while undergoing its first flight at the Boeing
Helicopter Flight Test Center in Wilmington, Delaware (Bell -Boeing ACFT 5-1,
1991, p. 1).
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redirecting funding for procurement of shipbuilding to help
defray the cost of the V-22 program. (SASC Report No. 102-
113, 1991, pp. 115-116)
The House Appropriations Committee's bill paralleled
the House Armed Services Committee authorization; however, the
House Appropriations Committee provided specific guidance for
the disposition of appropriated funds. First, the $365
million was directed to obligated by October 31, 1991, in
support on a new Phase II FSD program. Second, $357 million
is to be obligated by November 30, 1991, for ten production-
like airplanes. Finally, the Department of Defense is
directed to provide Congress the Total Funding Plan and
Schedule to complete engineering and marketing development
(Phase II) within 60 days after enactment of the bill.
(Phoncon Bell-Boeing Business Development Manager, 1991) As
evidenced by the increasingly restrictive language and
detailed guidance, the House Appropriations Committee has
attempted to make difficult any future program deviations by
the Secretary of Defense.
The Senate Appropriations Committee appropriated no
new funding for either R&D or procurement in FY-92. The
Committee recommended "transfer of prior year funds to R&D
($165 million) as requested in the President's budget." (SAC
Report No. 102-154, 1991, p. 142) However, the Committee
approved $465 million for procurement and $50 million for R&D
to "restart" CH-46E production (SAC Report No. 102-54, 1991,
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p. 142, p. 267). The Committee justified its actions by
noting that "...Marines may yet have the opportunity to
purchase V-22 aircraft. . .In the meantime no progress will have
been made in redressing the medium-lift shortfall" (SAC
Report No. 102-54, 1991, p. 142).
The V-22, as a case example, is but one of a myriad of
critical defense programs - a micro issue in the scheme of
overall defense. What sets the V-22 apart from other weapon
acquisition programs is the broad support within Congress.
The program is, in essence, an example of Congress' ability to
cross partisan lines, and its commitment to the preeminent
position of the United States as the guardian of tiltrotor
technology. Comprehensive figures on congressional action in
FY-92 may be found in Appendix (B).
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V. CONCLUSION
A. PURPOSE OF CHAPTER
This chapter addresses the three research questions
presented in Chapters I and IV: What does the V-22 teach us
with respect to defense budgeting? Second, what are the roles
and relationships between the military departments, the
Department of Defense, contractors, and the Congress in
budgeting for the V-22? Finally, what are the program
implications resulting from the political competition between
the Secretary of Defense, Congress, and other interested
parties in financial terms, and in terms of the future of the
V-22? Further analysis of these roles and relationships
provides some answers to these questions. The thesis will be
concluded by addressing all the research questions presented
in Chapter I, and some suggestions for further V-22 research.
B. ROLES AND RELATIONSHIPS IN THE BUDGET PROCESS
Either directly or indirectly, all the players (the
Congress, the contractors, the Administration, and the Marine
Corps) have been involved in the politics of the budgetary
process. This section provides additional insight into their
opinions and relationship to the V-22 program. It is proper
to begin by highlighting the visibility factors that appear to
have affected the program.
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Everyone agrees that the V-22 program is expensive. In
this period of declining financial resources, the V-22 sticks
out in the defense budget like the proverbial sore thumb.
Whether the V-22 is an expensive developmental program, or is
justified by the payoff from the technology it advances,
invokes considerable debate. Ultimately, the decision rests
with our elected leaders. Unfortunately, from the Marine
Corps' view, continued production postponement only serves to
aggravate the realization of the V-22 as an airplane in their
inventory. According to Marine Deputy Chief of Staff for
Aviation, "time is probably our worst enemy right now" (Bond,
1991, p. 26).
The problems associated with development are well
publicized. Every defect has been countered. For example,
the General Accounting Office testimony notes cost overruns of
between $200 and $242 million (Ferber, 1991, p. 3). The
contractors suggest overruns are due partly to rapid advances
of the technology and partly to delays with the program. The
GAO advises that procurement should proceed only after
resolving technical problems, i.e., weight, latency problems
with the flight control system, vibration, and production of
the composite material (GAO report B-240825, 1990, pp. 1-6).
The program manager has flown a prototype and was satisfied
with the adjustments contractors made (Koszczuk, 1991, p. F-
1). Further, the contractors anticipated problems cited by
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the GAO and actually plan to incorporate the changes into
production by design (Ferber, 1991, p. 9).
Also, the General Accounting Office considers the V-22
program to be highly risky. Therefore, to comply with DoD
instructions on defense acquisition the GAO would expect Naval
contracting officers to assign a cost plus contract to the V-
22 program. However, Secretary of the Navy John Lehman's
decision to direct a fixed price contract due to the
"maturity" of the technology effectively ended any debate on
this issue.
The political aspect, as it influences those who control
the purse strings, must not be overlooked. Fresh in the mind
of Congress is the FSX issue . Congress is concerned that we
may default this technology to an overseas market. Can the
crash of airplane number five remain free of political
posturing, especially by those members of Congress opposed to
the V-22 program? The Marine Corps, popular with Congress,
continues to operate the venerable CH-46, but this cannot
continue indefinitely. Finally, reduced dollars, jobs, and
the broad dependance of subcontractors from 48 states,
guarantees traditional pork and turf pressures in support of
V-22 production.
1 The FSX was an advanced fighter aircraft to be built in Japan with the
assistance of General Dynamics.
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1. Congressional opinion
The V-22 enjoys broad support with Congress, and has
encountered only minimal opposition. Some Congressmen,
originally resistant to the V-22 program, have subsequently
reversed their opinion in favor of development - to the point
of insistence. Technical knowledge of the program by Congress
runs the entire spectrum. Half the program's support is from
Congressmen advocating the commercial spinoff from the
military version. This factor alone distinguishes the V-22
program in that it extends beyond pork barrel politics.
(Phoncon CBO Analyst, 1991)
The Tiltrotor Coalition, a grass roots lobbying
organization, evolved to combat what it considers a "penny
wise and pound foolish" decision by the Secretary of Defense
to cancel the V-22. Its constituency includes prominent
business leaders, influential members of Congress, and many
civilians and contractors. Foreign competitors acknowledge
that the United States is the preeminent leader of tiltrotor
technology. Members of the Tiltrotor Coalition believe our
nation cannot afford to import tiltrotor technology from
overseas. Therefore, the coalition aggressively promotes the
advantages of tiltrotor technology to the nation's aerospace
industry. Their effort to involve all the subcontractors in
active lobbying has proven instrumental to the resuscitation
of, and continued funding for, the V-22 program.
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Marines enjoy an enviable status with Congress. The
Marine Corps is regarded as efficient and innovative, and
considered the underdog - having to employ the "leftovers"
from the other services. Rowan Scarborough, a reporter for
the Washington Times observed that "The continued support of
the Marine Corps - the smallest military branch with the
largest congressional fan club - has been a big factor in the
Osprey's winning ways" (Scarborough, 1991, p. 4). Congress
seems to identify with the Marine Corps and is quick to
support its military leadership. Because of the Corps'
credibility, its support for the V-22 program, whether through
official or unofficial channels, has not gone unnoticed by
Congress. Representative Curt Weldon provided the following
comments
:
"The pencil pushers in the Pentagon say they don't want
the V-22. But the warriors who command the troops say
they do want it. If the Marine Corps told me to back off,
I'd back off. But they're not telling me to do that."
(Scarborough, 1991, p. 4)
"We've won the battle, not because of pork, but because it
has solid, deep support in Congress, and in the Pentagon
from the standpoint of the service leaders" (Scarborough,
1991, p. 4).
In short, members of Congress believe the Marine Corps
represents a quality force and remain committed to ensuring
that the necessary funding is appropriated.
Finally, the Congress, surprised by the decision to
cancel the V-22 program and irritated by the obstinate
position of the Secretary of Defense, has emphasized one
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crucial point. Congress, by law, has the power to raise and
equip military forces for national defense. Congress then,
controls the purse strings, and relies on the Administration
only for advice plus budget execution and management
expertise.
2. Industry perspective
According to B. Dan Pinick, president of Boeing
Defense and Space Group, "...aerospace companies must learn to
manufacture major systems economically at low rates" (Bond,
1991, p. 26). Contractors realize that dealing with the
government involves certain inherent risk. Most contractors
seek to break even on the development of a major system
program, calculating their profit from a stable configuration
during production. (Phoncon Bell-Boeing Supervisor Naval
Requirements and Marketing Director, 1991) A goal of the
government's acquisition strategy is equitable distribution of
risk. As such, specific contract types are used for each
stage of procurement development relative to perceived risk.
(DoD Manual 5000. 2-M, 1991, pp. 22-1 - 22-1-2)
When Secretary of the Navy John Lehman directed a
fixed price contract for the V-22, the Navy gained near-term
savings. Fixed price contracts shift the risk from the
government to the contractor. However, industry cannot afford
to accept all the risk for a development program like the V-
22. Therefore, if the government is not willing to support
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the technology, the airplane probably won't be built by a U.S.
aerospace company. The FSD contract for the V-22 bought the
Navy six airplanes (now five), plus the data rights. The
contract does not include any tooling changes necessary before
pilot production. The government will only have to pay up to
the contracted amount for FSD - in reality only a short-term
savings. (Phoncon Bell-Boeing Business Development Manager,
1991)
But if the V-22 is built, the government will
ultimately pay a larger cost because of the FSD contract
strategy and the decision to cancel the program. When the
contract becomes "locked in," so does the technology. The
purchaser receives what was contracted for, and no more.
Unfortunately, rapidly advancing technology becomes reduced to
suggested modification. As mentioned earlier, the Navy will
now have to renegotiate the pilot production contract
obviously an expensive prospect considering previous
experience
.
3. Administration/Department of Defense perspective
For its part, top management at the Pentagon has
remained consistent in its opposition to the V-22 program.
Secretary Cheney acknowledges the capabilities of the V-22,
but insists the limited mission does not offset the immediate
cost. The Secretary subsequently reaffirmed his position
77
after the IDA study was issued . As noted in Chapter IV, in
support of Secretary Cheney's position, the Department of
Defense Comptroller has withheld funding appropriated for
procurement of the V-22. Secretary Cheney has since approved
the redirection of procurement funds into R&D accounts. It is
unclear whether he will abide by the language contained in the
FY-92 appropriation bill if passed.
4. Marine Corps perspective
Officially, the Marine Corps must support the position
of the Secretary of Defense. Privately, most Marines support
the V-22 program, and when questioned by congressional
committees, will speak favorably on the capabilities and
necessity of the airplane . The Corps stresses the need for
advanced avionics to operate at night and in adverse weather.
Further, they point out that helicopter technology is at its
upper limit.
The Marine Corps is not in favor of the proposed mix
of CH-53E/CH-60 for the following reasons. First, the CH-53E
is a logistical airplane, ill-suited for combat assault.
Second, the CH-60, with half the troop carrying capacity of
the V-22, would require twice the number of lifts and change
The results of the IDA study are still in draft form. The Assistant
Secretary for Defense, Program, Analysis, and Evaluation has chosen not to
formally publish the results. This might indicate dissatisfaction with the
findings
.
3 Marines are prohibited from overt lobbying for the V-22 program.
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the tactical squad. Former Marine Commandant, General Al
Gray, stated " . . .funding an aircraft to meet the Corps' medium
lift needs is the most pressing issue for Marines this year"
(Donnovan, Steigman, 1990, p. 4). With the Marine CH-46 well
into its third decade of operation, its seems likely that this
position will remain unchanged.
C. CONCLUDING COMMENTS TO THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS PRESENTED IN
CHAPTER I.
This section addresses the research questions presented in
Chapter I, and throughout the thesis. The research questions
will be restated, followed by comments highlighting answers
contained in the thesis.
1. Using the V-22 as a case example, what are the
programmatic and financial implications for the
Department of Defense and industry of dual -use
technology?
• Dual-use technology does not play well at the Department
of Defense. Synthesizing dual-use strategy with the
defense acquisition process may conflict with system
performance that is desired by the military departments.
For the Department of Defense, dual-use technology may be
a convenient but not crucial selling point.
• Defense related industries interested in dealing with the
Department of Defense will continue to advance dual -use
technology as a strong selling point. According to one
industry analyst, all future weapon systems must have
spinoff application if the program is to succeed.
(Phoncon Industry Analyst, 1991)
• Indirect spinoff resulting from V-22 technology has major
financial and programmatic implications. Prompt
development of a civil tiltrotor by domestic industry may
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generate $28 billion in export in the first ten years of
availability (NASA Phase II Final Report, 1991, p. 3).
• The V-22 program has been subjected to two bad timing
events, i.e., program delays and major budget reductions.
Still, the V-22 program has survived because of its broad-
based support for the technology it represents.
2. What does the V-22 teach us about the process of
defense budgeting?
• The V-22 is a highly contentious project as evidenced by
increasingly specific language found in congressional
reports and attention by the media. Like most other major
systems, the V-22 is imbued with traditional pork and turf
issues
.
• Without support by senior executives within the Department
of Defense, Congress has chosen to continue funding for
the V-22 program. Congressional support is bipartisan
because of the value of V-22 technology to both military
and commercial application.
• Long term programs such as the V-22 are subject to short
term decisions , i.e., annual program/budget reviews by the
Department of Defense and Congress. Funding instability
resulting from these annual reviews has made long term
production plans difficult. This uncertainty translates
into an increase in the total cost of the program.
• Objective conclusions on the programmatic budget process
are difficult. Even technically sound, efficient, and
promising major system programs may not be guaranteed.
While we would like to believe the "best" systems are
obtained, all too often the progress/success is driven by
the human element "reacting" to the current political and
budgetary mood.
• The V-22 is no longer a programmatic issue. That ended
when Secretary Cheney cancelled the program. The V-22
program now represents a battle between the Executive and
Legislative branches over their specific defense
responsibilities. Both branches are at odds over the
equipment and strategy to meet the threat and the question
of control over defense resources.
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3. How do DoD, Congress, and contractors view the
importance of potential civilian applications
resulting from the V-22?
• More than half the congressional support for the V-22 is
for tiltrotor technology, i.e., concern for the civil vice
military application.
• For the Department of Defense, performance and capability
of a major system is still the primary concern. Adoption
of dual-use technology as part of the acquisition strategy
has been slow.
• FAA officials are firmly convinced that tiltrotor
technology may reduce congestion of national airspace,
increase safety, and provide an economic boost to the
economy
.
• Bell and Boeing promote the civil potential of the V-22
with different levels of intensity. As described in the
thesis, a commercial variant of the V-22 will require
major modification.
4. Given a declining military budget, should the
Department of Defense continue programs such as the V-
22 to sustain the defense industrial base?
• The Department of Defense should not be expected to
support all dual-use programs. There exist different
motives and ways of conducting business between defense
and commercial industries that prevent complete
integration. However, an aerospace industry with dual-use
capability provides an asset generic to all the military
departments. Also, the V-22 is a special airplane because
it has been designed from the ground up to satisfy
missions required by all the military departments.
• Encouraging major systems with attributes similar to the
V-22 airplane may prove beneficial to the Department of
Defense to maximize shrinking defense dollars while
maintaining a viable industrial base. This has become
even more acute as the nation may rely on an increasingly
larger percentage of reconstituted forces.
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• Dual-use technology is not applicable to every major
system. The maximum benefit from dual-use technology is
gained by tailoring policy to the individual program
5. What are the roles and relationships between the
military departments, the Department of Defense, the
contractors, and Congress in budgeting for the V-22?
• Congress continues to resuscitate the V-22 program by
funding R&D. The differences between the Executive and
Legislative branches are not yet resolved. Still, the
door is open to obtain V-22 airplanes because of language
contained in FY-92 congressional committee reports that
provides a politically acceptable alternative to both
sides, i.e., production-like aircraft funded by R&D.
Given this, the Congress may continue to support
development while the Secretary of Defense may claim he
has not backed down from his decision to cancel the V-22.
• Joint service programs are not a particularly strong
selling point especially during lean budget times. This
results from increased scrutiny by the military
departments of their available discretionary funds.
• The contractors are skeptical of the Department of Defense
and vice versa. In short, at stake is a credibility
issue. Bell and Boeing were frightened by Secretary
Lehman's decision to impose a fixed price contract.
Similarly, the program sponsor at NAVAIR is concerned by
recurring delays and technical difficulties. These
anomalies do not enhance their relationship. However,
most defense contractors realize an inherent risk when
accepting government contracts.
6. What are the programmatic implications resulting from
the political competition between the Secretary of
Defense and Congress and other interested parties in
financial terms, and in terms of decisions on the
future of the V-22?
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• The program as it stands now may result in reduced buys
and stretched procurement schedules, hence, a higher unit
cost .
• According to the Marine Deputy of Aviation, time is
against the V-22 program, i.e., continued delays increase
the likelihood that the airplane will not be in the Corps'
inventory. This uncertainty is a negative impact for
Marine Corps warfare planners as they seek a replacement
for the CH-46 to complement existing equipment and
doctrine
.
• The aerospace industry awaits the outcome resulting from
military operational testing of the V-22 before aggressive
development of a civil airplane. The FAA's proactive
posture toward tiltrotor technology and infrastructure is
viewed by industry as a positive signal by one branch of
the federal government. Still, until the V-22 has
recorded more hours of flight time, it is unlikely a civil
airplane will be developed by an American firm(s).
D. SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER V-22 RELATED RESEARCH
Further research may concentrate on three areas
highlighted in this thesis. First, the Department of Defense
seems to be in a cyclical pattern of favoring a FP contract
then a CP contract, then returning again to a FP contract.
Contractors, military officials, and members of Congress are
perplexed by this vacillating policy. The effect on major
systems is uncertainty, indecision, and ultimately a higher
unit cost.
Second, teaming agreements may become increasingly
prevalent as defense contractors seek to maximize resources
Because the V-22 can carry more combat assault Marines than the CH-46,
less deck space will be required on amphibious ships; therefore, Congress has
directed the Department of Defense to look into the potential savings from
reduced ship procurement offsetting the cost of V-22 buys.
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and enhance their ability to secure a government contract.
The relationship between "teamed" defense contractors requires
that a myriad of issues be addressed and understood up-front.
Finally, the writing of this thesis concludes during a
period that will become pivotal to the realization of a V-22
airplane in our nation's defense inventory. Assuming the
Executive and Legislative branches resolve their differences,
and technical difficulties do not become "showstoppers , " the
first V-22 may be in the Corps' inventory around 1996.
Therefore, continued documentation of the ongoing competition
and potential production of the V-22 is needed because of the
unprecedented position the Congress has chosen to take in
support of the program.
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APPENDIX A1
Chronology of V-22 Events
Dec 1958 . Bell Helicopter's XV-3 makes first in-flight
conversion from helicopter to fixed wing airplane.
- Boeing Helicopter's VZ-2 tiltwing makes maiden
flight.
Dec 1972 . NASA and Department of Army (DOA) award Bell
Helicopter a contract to develop two tiltrotor demonstrators
(XV-15)
.
Jul 1979 . XV-15 makes first in-flight conversion from
helicopter to fixed wing airplane.
Jul 1981 . XV-15 demonstrated at the Paris Air Show.
Secretary of the Navy in attendance.
Aug 1981 . Under Secretary of Defense (Research and
Engineering) sends memorandum to Secretary of the Air Force
and Secretary of the Navy suggesting a common solution be
developed for a number of service rotary wing requirements.
Dec 1981 . Deputy Secretary of Defense decision memorandum
establishes the Joint Services Aircraft program (JVX).
Decision regarded as approval for concept formulation -
waives requirement for a Justification of a Major Systems
New Start.
Feb 1982 . Joint Technology Assessment Group (JTAG),
comprised of all the services, gathers to consider
alternative designs for JVX.
Apr 1982 . Bell-Boeing Tiltrotor Team formed (teaming
agreement signed the following month).
May 1982 . JTAG determines tiltrotor design as preferred
al ternative
.
Information contained in this Appendix was obtained in part, from three
sources to include: Smith, Danny Roy, Thornborough, Anthony and the GAO report
dated 1986. Please refer to the List of References.
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Jun 1982 . The three Service Secretaries sign a Memorandum
of Understanding (MOU) in support of the JVX program
including development funding shares: Army 46%, Navy 42%,
Air Force 12%. Shares negotiated based on estimates of
overall procurement potential. DOA designated executive
service.
Aug 1982 . XV-15 becomes the first tiltrotor to operate from
a fully combat-capable Marine assault ship, the USS Tripoli.
Sep 1982 . JVX acquisition strategy approved by Chief of
Naval Material
.
Dec 1982 . Deputy Secretary of Defense approves JVX
acquisition strategy and establishes full-scale development
(FSD) as the next Secretary of Defense decision point.
- Department of the Navy (DON) replaces DOA as
executive service.
- Joint Service Operational Requirement (JSOR)
signed. Tiltrotor design determined to be capable of
performing all the services' missions.
- DON changes acquisition strategy from Fixed
Price (FP) to Cost Plus (CP).
- Deputy Secretary of Defense directs JVX program
to go through a Defense System Acquisition Review Council
(DSARC) review for FSD.
Bell -Boeing submits preliminary design proposal.
- Sikorsky drops out of design competition.
Bell-Boeing awarded preliminary design contract.
DOA withdraws from JVX program.
- Department of the Air Force (DOAF) reduces
planned procurement from 200 to 80 airplanes.
Sep 1983 : Defense Resources Board (DRB) approves
continuation of JVX. Full funding to be included in Navy
total obligational authority (TOA).
- DOA reenters program committed to buying 231
airplanes of the Marine version.









FSD started at Bell-Boeing.
Allison selected, after competition, to develop
the engine for the V-22
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Apr 1986 : DSARC recommends that V-22 program continue to
FSD.
May 1986 : Secretary of Defense approves FSD. FSD contract
awarded to Bell-Boeing.
May 1987 : DOAF reduces their V-22 requirement from 80 to 55
airplanes
.
Feb 1988 : DOA withdraws from V-22 program to support their
requirement for LHX
.
May 1988 : First V-22 prototype rolled out at Arlington,
Texas
.
Jul 1988 : Program Budget Decision (PBD) for FY-89 approves
sole source procurement; however, requirement for
competition during production maintained.
Aug 1988 : Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and the DON
sign a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) allowing FAA to
participate in ground testing the V-22 and access to
technical data.
Dec 1988 : Bell-Boeing submits revised proposal for 12 co-
produced airplanes.
Jan 1989 : Under Secretary of the Navy directs procurement
using a competitive acquisition strategy.
- Allison awarded engine contract.
- Long Lead Funds (LLF) placed on contract for
pilot production engines.
Feb 1989 : LLF placed on contract with Bell-Boeing for 12
pilot production airplanes.
Mar 1989 : V-22 No 1 makes first hover at Bell's plant in
Arlington, Texas.
Apr 1989 : Tentative DRB decision to cancel V-22 received.
DON reclama submitted six days later. DRB cancels V-22 the
following day.
- Unanimous "Sense of the Senate" resolution
passed supporting restoration of the program.
- FY-90 budget submitted to Congress recommending
termination of the V-22 program; hence, no funding is
requested for FY-90 and out.
May 1989 : Bell -Boeing announces that it has expended all
obligated funds for FY-89, and that it will continue
development with its own funds through the end of FY-89.
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Aug 1989 ; V-22 No 2 makes first flight at Arlington.
Sep 1989 : V-22 No 1 makes full conversion from helicopter
to fixed wing mode.
Nov 1989 : Congress approves and President Bush signs $255
million for continuation of Research and Development (R&D)
effort; LLF are absent.
Dec 1989 : Termination for the convenience of the government
letters forwarded to Bell-Boeing and Allison for LLF.
Funding recovered and placed on hold at DOD
.
- V-22 No 4 makes first flight at Boeing's test
facility in Wilmington, Delaware.
Jan 1990 : President's FY-91 budget submitted to Congress
with no funding for FY-91 and out.
Mar 1990 : The three operational V-22's complete the 100th
hour of flight test time.
Apr 1990 : First three military pilots test V-22.
- XV-15 lands on the grounds of the U.S. Capitol.
May 1990 : V-22 No 3 makes first flight at Arlington.
Dec 1990 : V-22's Nos 3 & 4 make successful shipboard
compatibility test on board the USS Wasp confirming
capability of operating safely from amphibious assault
ships, a key military requirement.
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